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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction and Research Question 
Since the beginning of the atomic age, nuclear weapons proliferation has been on of the 
major security issues facing the international society, and a growing concern for the 
consequences of a potential spread of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of World War II led 
to the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The two main 
purposes of the treaty was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon 
states, and for the five recognised nuclear weapon states to disarm and reduce their 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The NPT is the centrepiece of a network of interlocking, 
overlapping, and mutually reinforcing mechanisms and arrangements that are commonly 
referred to as the international non-proliferation regime1. Since the first nuclear weapons 
were developed in 1945, nuclear proliferation has emerged as a significant international 
security relation’s problem in the international society. John F. Kennedy2 predicted in the 
early 1960s that 20 to 30 states would soon be in possession of nuclear weapons. The 
possession of nuclear weapons has become an important power tool in the nuclear age, and 
yet only a handful of states are today in the possession of what has been referred to as the 
“absolute weapon”.  The NPT has, since it entered into force in 1970, become the most 
widely accepted international arms control agreement with 190 signatory members3. Still, 
after the end of the Cold War, concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation has grown 
rather than subsided, and continue to be one of the major challenges to international order. 
The research conducted in this thesis has grown out from interest rooted in the failed 
prediction made by John F. Kennedy, meaning that why are one witnessing the nuclear 
weapons situation in the international society that one do today and how important have the 
role of the NPT been in states decision to forgo or acquire nuclear weapons. In other words 
how can the nuclear weapons situation in the international society today be correlated either 
directly or indirectly to the work of the NPT as an international regime?  
 
States use a lot of time and efforts to create and maintain international institutions to help 
them solve problems in the international society. Therefore, one would assume that they 
                                                 
1 Mitchell Reiss. 1995. p 331 
2 Joseph Cirincione. 2007. p 28 
3 www.nupi..no/content/download/1150/31600/version/1/file/hhd02-3.pdf  
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also want to know how well they fit or match the reality towards which they are directed4. 
In this thesis I will look at how the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have performed as an 
international regime and how well it has fitted or matched the reality it is directed towards. 
An international regime is defined as "a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, 
plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which have been accepted by a 
group of states"5. I will base my research on two separate, but related questions. The first 
question is an empirical question, which will be based around different empirical facts. The 
second question is a theoretical question that seeks to explore how different theories of 
international relations and their view on international regimes can explain the empirical 
facts and how these empirical facts consist with their theoretical explanation of international 
regimes. The two research questions this thesis will try to answer sounds as follows: 
(1) To what degree has the Non-proliferation Treaty been able to achieved its goals?  
(2) How can the degree of success or failure connected to goal achievement be e 
explained according to different regime theories? 
 
To answer the first question, I will need to look at what constitutes the goals of the treaty 
and how the treaty has been able to contribute directly or indirectly to the degree of goal 
achievement. To establish a degree of goal achievement one first need to establish what 
constitutes regime effectiveness, and how one need to go about when it comes to measure 
its effect. Although few doubt that international institutions are an important feature of the 
contemporary international system, theorists in the field of international relations are deeply 
divided about how and why international institutions are formed and maintained, and what 
role they play in the international society6.  The three theories of international relations I 
have chosen to use in this thesis regarding my second question are neorealism, 
neoliberalism, and constructivism. The reason why I have chosen these three theories will 
be elaborated in chapter 2. While all of the three theories of international relations presented 
in this thesis, base their arguments on the structure of the international system when it 
comes to international cooperation, they differ in their view of what constitutes the 
structure, and provide different arguments for when and why one are able to expect or 
experience international cooperation. They will therefore also most likely have different 
arguments for why the goal achievements of the NPT have been a failure or a success.  
                                                 
4 Alexander Wendt. 2001. p 1043 
5 Roger K. Smith. 1987. p 256 
6 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owns. 2008. p 298 
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1.2. Regime Effectiveness 
According to Arild Underdal7, one of the basic questions in the study of international 
cooperation is; why are some collective problems solved more easily or effective than 
others? This question may be decomposed into several sub-questions: One pertains to the 
conditions under which some kind of cooperative arrangement can or is likely to be 
established. Another pertains to the condition under which the arrangement that is 
established will be effective, in some precise meaning of that word. At least two good 
reasons can be given for shifting some of our research efforts from the former to the latter 
question. One is simply that if our goal is to understand the conditions for "success" and the 
causes of "failure" in international problem solving, one must have a sound definition and a 
valid indicator of success. Focusing merely on the establishment of joint arrangement would 
clearly not meet this requirement. Analytically, institutions can be significant in two 
respects: they may be more or less effective, and they may be more or less robust. While 
effectiveness involves a static perspective in the sense that it can be determined at and for 
any given point in time, robustness is essentially a dynamic measure of the significance of 
regimes, the application of which presupposes a relevant change in the regime environment. 
Regime effectiveness comprises two overlapping ideas. First, a regime is effective to the 
extent that its members abide by its norms and rules. Second, a regime is effective to the 
extent that it achieves certain objectives or fulfils certain purposes. In contrast, regime 
robustness refers to the "staying power" of international institutions in the face of 
exogenous challenges and to the extent to which prior institutional choices constrain 
collective decisions and behaviour in later periods, i.e. to the extent to which institutional 
history matters. In other words, institutions that change with every shift of power among 
their members or whenever the most powerful participants find that their interests are no 
longer optimally served by the current regime, lack robustness8. So even if a regime is not 
effective it may be robust, meaning that as long as there exists a willingness by one or 
several states to preserve the regime, it may continue to remain as an international 
institution. Even if a regime is not effective in the sense that it is progressing towards a goal, 
it may be a mean to preserve status quo or a belief that the institution will be able to serve 
some purpose over time. States use a lot of time and efforts to create international 
institutions and in some occasions it will be wiser to maintain an institution rather then try 
                                                 
7 Arild Underdal. 1992. p 227 
8 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. 1997. p 2 
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to establish a new one every time a problem surfaces. Regarding my first research question, 
and the degree of goal achievement of the NPT, I will place emphasis on the former.  
 
Any attempt at designing a framework for the study of regime effectiveness must cope with 
at least three questions: (1) what precisely constitutes the object to be evaluated? To answer 
this question one need to determine whether the interested is solely in the substantive 
arrangement, or also in the costs incurred in producing and maintaining it9. In this thesis I 
shall deal only with the treaty itself and what I would like to refer to as a macro perspective; 
the costs of producing or maintaining it will not be considered in this thesis. (2) Against 
which standard is the object to be evaluated? Defining an evaluation standard involves at 
least two main steps. One is to determine the point of reference against which actual 
achievement is to be compared; the other is to determine what might be called the unit of 
measurement. It seems that there are basically two points of reference that merit serious 
consideration in this context. One is the hypothetical state of affair that would have come 
about had the regime not existed, this is a counter-factual question. This point of reference 
leads us to conceive of “effectiveness” in term of relative improvement caused by the 
regime. The other option is to evaluate a regime against some concept of collective 
optimum. This is the appropriate perspective if the goal is to determine to what extent a 
collective problem is in fact “solved” under present arrangements. These two approaches 
are clearly complementary. Even a regime leading to a substantial improvement may fall 
short of being “perfect”10. When it comes to the standard the object is to be evaluated 
against regarding the aim of study, it is the latter standard that will be considered in this 
thesis. The NPT is divided into three different pillars. These are non-proliferation, the right 
to peaceful use of nuclear technology, and disarmament. In this thesis I have chosen to 
exclude the pillar regarding right to peaceful use of nuclear technology, and focused on the 
pillars that deal with nuclear weapons. When it comes to goal achievement I have therefore 
chosen to focus only on two pillars non-proliferation and disarmament. So when it comes to 
what extent the collective problem of nuclear proliferation is in fact “solved” under present 
arrangement, one need to look at to what degree the regime has been able to achieve its 
goals, mainly preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and the work towards complete 
disarmament of nuclear weapons. (3) How do we operationally go about comparing the 
object to our standard; in other words, what kind of measurement operations do we have to 
                                                 
9  Arild Underdal. 1992. p 229 
10 Arild Underdal. 1992. p 230-231 
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perform in order to attribute a certain score of ‘effectiveness’ to a certain object (regime)11? 
When it comes to measuring the effect of the NPT there is no set measurements of what 
constitutes effect other than a subjective opinion on what degree the treaty has been able to 
achieve its goals. So the degree of goal achievement will be a subjective conception of 
success or failure based on the empirical facts collected during the research of this thesis.  
 
1.3. Method 
This thesis will be based on two research questions. The first question will be answered 
based on a subjective understanding of the degree of success or failure according to the goal 
achievement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since my first question is based on a 
subjective understanding on my interpretation of the empirical material used to conduct this 
research, others may on the same information provided in this thesis come to a different 
conclusion. The second research question is a comparison between three different theories 
of international regimes, viewed from neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism, and 
how they can explain the "success" or "failure" of the NPT established in my first question. 
Both questions will be based on case studies. Case studies is characterized by research that 
is directed towards studying a large quantity of information about few units or cases, and 
that the focus for the analysis is directed towards one or several entities that represents the 
research "case(s)"12. 
 
The great advantage of the cases study is that by focusing on a few single cases, where each 
of them can be intensively examined even when the research resources at the investigators 
disposal are relatively limited13. In this thesis I will look closer at twelve different cases 
eight states and four arms control agreements. The states I have chosen to use are South 
Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Pakistan, North Korea (DPRK), and Iran, and when 
it comes to the arms control agreements I have chosen START I, START II, SORT, and the 
ABM treaty14. The cases have been selected on two criteria’s. First criteria are their 
relevance for the study. This research is trying to understand why states chose to forgo or 
acquire nuclear weapons therefore a state that don’t have the capability or at any time 
considered developing nuclear weapons is not relevant for this study. For the arms reduction 
                                                 
11 Arild Underdal. 1992. p 228-229 
12 Tove Thagaard. 2002. p 47 
13 Arend Lijphart. 1971. p 691 
14 START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), SORT (Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty or   Moscow 
Treaty), and the ABM treaty (Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty). 
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agreements, relevance will be based on agreements that aim at limiting or reduce nuclear 
weapons. Second criteria are the availability of information about the cases, also in 
consideration of the time and recourses available for the research. The amount of 
information available for this research has been varying among the twelve cases. The reason 
for my selection of these specific states and arms control agreements will be further 
elaborated in chapter 4, where they are presented. The scientific status of the case study 
method is somewhat ambiguous, however, because science is a generalizing activity. A 
single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for 
disproving an established generalization. Indirectly, however, case studies can make an 
important contribution to the establishment of general propositions and thus to theory 
building in political science15.   
 
Case studies can have a comparative design when the reason for the research is to look at 
the comparison between several cases16. The core of the comparative design is to find a 
theoretical interesting comparison between two or more cases in space and time17. The first 
focus of this thesis is to look at eight different states with the aim of explaining why they 
have chosen to forgo or acquire nuclear weapons, and to better understand the policies of 
these states. I will look at differences and similarities that may shed some light on why these 
states have chosen their nuclear weapons direction, and how the NPT may have influenced 
their decisions directly or indirectly. In addition to the states I will also look at different 
arms control agreements and how they may have contributed to the reduction of nuclear 
weapons in the recognized nuclear weapons states. The second focus is to compare three 
different views on regime theory and how they can explain the empirical evidences 
presented in this thesis, and the degree of goal achievement established in my first question. 
The comparative method should not lapse into the traditional quotation/illustration 
methodology, where cases are picked that is in accordance with the hypothesis- and 
hypotheses are rejected if one deviant case is found. All cases should, of course be selected 
systematically, and the scientific research should be aimed at probabilistic, not universal, 
generalization18. I have tried to select cases that represent different aspects of states 
acquisition and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, and arms control agreements that may 
have different conditions for contributing to nuclear disarmament. The amount of 
                                                 
15 Arend Lijphart. 1971. p 691 
16 Tove Thagaard. 2002. p 48 
17  Kristen Ringdal. 2001. p 177 
18 Arendt Lijphart. 1971. p 686 
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information available to conduct this research have also been a factor for my selection, so in 
addition to select cases that I have seen relevant for my research, I have also selected cases 
where it in my opinion have been possible to collect sufficient information to conduct the 
research itself. The NPT as an international regime has existed for forty years. To limit the 
time period of the research I have therefore chosen to focus the emphasis of my analysis on 
the time period between 1990 and 2007. But I don’t believe that the analysis can be totally 
isolated from previous historical happenings. Therefore I have chosen to include events 
taking place prior to 1990 that I believe has an importance for the analysis.  
 
As a part of the research plan the researcher needs to take a stand at how information is 
going to be collected. Which method is relevant19? I have chosen to base this research solely 
on written data, in the form of books, scientific articles, and Internet databases. Based on the 
field of study, I have seen written data as the most relevant, and it has allowed me to collect 
information that I would not bee able to produce. To find the sources used in this thesis I 
have used the University of Tromsø library, the online article archives Jstore and 
ArticleFirst. Internet have also been used to collect data, since some of my cases have 
unfolded presently and some are still unfolding Internet have been a valuable tool, since 
online sources are continually updated. When it comes to the analysis of written data there 
are some important questions that need to be asked. One of these questions is when the 
information was produced? This question has been mostly relevant for the empirical 
information, to establish when it was produced to place a phenomenon in time, and in 
comparison to other sources20. When it comes to the empirical information I have mainly 
used sources produced after 1990, because I have chosen to focus my analysis on the time 
period after the Cold War. I have tried to collect sources that are relatively new, I have 
strived to find sources produced after 2000 to increase the perspective the source might 
have on the empirical material it’s presenting. The second question is who has produced the 
information that is being used? This is because we need to determine if the source is valid, 
and credible21. I have tried to select information provided by what I have seen as recognized 
and well-established scholars within the theoretical framework and the research field in 
question, this I have done to make as sure as possible that the source has a high degree of 
credibility.  In addition I have used books and  articles, that I believe have been published 
                                                 
19 Tove Thagaard. 2002. p 58 
20 Knut Kjeldstadlie. 2007 p 175 
21 Knut Kjeldstadlie. 2007 p 175 
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by recognized publishers and periodicals. Uses of Internet also provide a need to analyse the 
sources with a more critical view than books and articles, which normally have stronger 
restrictions for publishing. I have tried to basically use Internet sources produced by reliable 
organizations and institutions. The selection has also been based on the availability of 
information, especially when it comes to the empirical data, where the availability of 
information has been varying for each case; the information available have also been 
varying from theory to theory. Information about how the theories view the NPT has been 
varying from limited when it comes to neorealism, and absent in the case of neoliberalism 
and constructivism. A third question is; are the information a first-hand or second-hand 
source?22 The source to be preferred is the primary, which means the source that is closet in 
space and time to the subject that is being researched among the sources that is available. If 
one got a first-hand source this is the primary, and all others secondary, if one don’t have a 
first-hand source the closest source is the primary23. Regarding the international relations 
theories I have tried to collect primary sources from recognized scholars within the different 
theories such as Kenneth N. Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer, Robert O. Keohane and Alexander 
Wendt to the extent it has been possible and secondary sources where primary hasn’t been 
available, or sufficient. According to Kjeldstadli24 the most desirable is to have multiple 
independent sources that present the same facts. When it comes to the empirical information 
regarding both the primary and secondary sources I have tried to find more than one source 
that presents the same facts to increase the validity of the information, to the extent it has 
been possible.  
 
1.4. Overview of the thesis 
In chapter 2 I will present the theories that will be used in this thesis, neorealism, 
neoliberalism and constructivism. Before I look at how the three schools of thought explain 
the existence of international regimes, I will present a short introduction of the theories and 
how they view international relations. After each presentation of the three theories of 
international regimes, I have made a prediction of what we are expected to find in the 
analysis for the possibility of explaining success or failure according to the different 
theories. In Chapter 3 I will presents a short introduction of the history of nuclear weapons, 
and the establishment of the NPT and take a look at the different Articles of the treaty. In 
                                                 
22 Knut Kjeldstadlie. 2007. p 177 
23 Knut Kjeldstadlie. 2007. p 177-178 
24 Knut Kjeldstadlie. 2007. p 178 
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chapter 4 the empirical material that is going to make the basis for my analysis will be 
presented. The reason for my selection of states and bilateral arms control agreements will 
be further elaborated in at the beginning of the chapter. In chapter 5 I will return to the two 
research questions, and present the analysis of the thesis. I have chosen to look at the two 
research questions separately. When it comes to my first research question, the analysis will 
be divided into tree sections proliferation, disarmament and degree of success. In the 
proliferation section I will look at the eight countries presented in chapter 4 and how their 
decision to acquire or forgo nuclear weapons can be seen as a correlation to the NPT and its 
role as an international regime. In the disarmament section I will look at the work that have 
been conducted by the five recognized nuclear-weapons states towards reduction of their 
nuclear stockpiles. After I have established the degree of goal achievement I will return to 
my second research question and look at how the three different theories of international 
relations, can explain the degree of success or failure of goal achievement according to their 

























Chapter 2: Regime Theory 
 
I will start this chapter by explaining my choice for the selection of theories, before I give a 
presentation of the theories and how they view international relations. After this 
presentation I will look at how the three theories explain international regimes. In addition, 
after each presentation a prediction of what we are expected to find in the analysis for the 
possibility of explaining success or failure according to the different theories will be given. 
In addition during the presentation of the neorealist view on international relations I will 
also give a brief presentation of what Kenneth Waltz has referred to as the deterrent 
argument since it will be used in the analysis in chapter 5.  
 
2.1. Theoretical Approach 
When it comes to the international relations theories, I have chosen neorealism and 
neoliberalism because the two has been of the most influential approaches to international 
relations theory the last decades, and even if the two theories are based on the same core 
assumptions they separate on two main issues that lie at the centre of what is referred to as 
the neorealist-neoliberal debate. The first issue is the competition in seeking to understand 
how the structure of the anarchical context of the international system inhibits joint action 
among states that otherwise share common interests and how states sometimes overcome 
those inhibitions and achieve cooperation25. Along with the different view on the meaning 
and implications of anarchy, the second issue in the debate is the problem of absolute and 
relative gains, which I will come back to in more detail in the presentation of the theories. 
Constructivism on the other hand is part of the category critical international relations 
theory, which is a family of theories that includes, postmodernism, constructivism, neo-
Marxists, feminists, and others. What unites them is a concern with how world politics is 
“socially constructed,” which involves two basic claims: that the fundamental structures of 
international politics are social rather than strictly material, and that these structures shape 
actors identities and interests, rather than just their behaviour26. I have chosen 
constructivism because it offers an alternative understanding to a number of the central 
themes in international relations theory, including: the meaning of anarchy and balance of 
                                                 
25 Joseph Grieco. Robert Powell. Duncan Snidal. 1993. p 729 
26 Alexander Wendt. 1995. p 71 
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power, the relationship between state identity and interests, an elaboration of power, and the 
prospect of change in world politics27. 
 
2.3. Neorealism 
Realism is a school of thought that explains international relations in terms of power. 
Realism as we know it developed in reaction to a liberal tradition that realists called 
idealism28. While classical realism or so called human nature realism who dominated the 
study of international relations from the late 1940s, is based on the simple assumption that 
states are lead by human beings who have a “will” to power hardwired into them at birth. 
That is states have an insatiable appetite for power, or what Morgenthau calls “a limitless 
lust for power,” which means that they constantly look for opportunities to take the 
offensive and dominate other sates, and are therefore inherently aggressive. During the 
1970s neorealism came on the scene. Neorealism29 unlike classical realism, blames security 
competition among states on the anarchical structure of the international system, and not on 
human nature30. The anarchical structure of the international society forces security seeking 
states to compete with each other for power, because power is the best means to survive. 
Meaning that states are not inherently aggressive because they are infused with a will to 
power; instead states merely aim to survive31. The arguments developed by neorealists are 
deliberately limited to the systemic level of analysis. Meaning that the actor characteristics 
are given by assumption, rather than treated as variables, where changes in outcomes are 
explained not on the basis of variables in these actor characteristics, but on the basis of 
                                                 
27 Ted Hopf. 1998. p 172 
28 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse.  2006. p 55-56 
29 Neorealism may further be divided into defensive realism presented by Kenneth N. Waltz and offensive 
realism presented by John J. Mearsheimer. While they are both structural theories of international politics, 
meaning that states are concerned mainly with figuring out how to survive in a world where there is no agency to 
protect them from each other, and hence power is the key to their survival. Offensive realism parts company with 
defensive realism over the question of how much power states wants For defensive realists, the international 
structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to 
maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. 
Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are really found in world politics, because 
the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the 
expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefit outweigh the costs (John J. 
Mearsheimer. 2001. p 21). 
30 Classical realists or human nature realists recognize that international anarchy the absence of a governing 
authority over the great powers causes states to worry about the balance of power. But that structural constraint 
is treated as a second-order cause of state behavior. The principal driving force is international politics is the will 
to power inherent in every state in the system, and it pushes each of them to strive for supremacy (John J. 
Mearssheimer. 2001. p 19). 
31 John J. Mearsheimer. 2001. p 19 
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change in the attribute of the system itself32. Realism as a theory in general is an effort to 
explain both the behaviour of individual states and the characteristics of the international 
system as a whole. They are pessimists when it comes to international politics, they agree 
that creating a peaceful world would be desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the 
harsh world of security competition and war. The ontological given is that sovereign states 
are the constitutive components of the international system, states are treated as the 
principle actors in world politics. Therefore the theory focuses mainly on great powers, 
because these states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the 
deadliest wars 33. The international system is anarchical, it is a self-help system, and the 
structure of the international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their 
foreign policies. The anarchical structure of the international society states that there is no 
higher authority that can constrain or channel the behaviour of states. Realists tend not to 
draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” states, because all great powers act 
according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the 
government. Sovereign states are rational34 self-seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively 
concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical environment in 
which their security and well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilize their own 
resources against external threats. For realists, the fundamental analytical argument, the 
basic explanation for the behaviour of states, is the distribution of power in the international 
system and the place of a given state within that distribution, calculations about power 
dominate states thinking, and that states compete for power among themselves35. Realists 
argue that the general insecurity of international anarchy leads states to worry not simply 
how well they fare themselves (absolute gains) but how well they fare compared to other 
states (relative gains). The concern of fare compared to others makes cooperation difficult, 
even when states share common interests, because even if all states involved in the 
cooperation gain from working together, there is always an overhanging fear that one or 
more of the states will defect from the cooperation and gain more relative to the other states. 
To use the words of Kenneth Waltz: “When faced with the possibility of cooperation for 
mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are 
compelled to ask not `Will both of us gain? ` But `who will gain more? ` If an expected gain 
                                                 
32 Robert O. Keohane in Stephen D. Krasner. 1983. p 143 
33 John J. Mearsheimer. 2001. p 19 
34 Actors act rational when they have weight the expected cost and benefits of different courses of action, and the 
one with the maximum valuable outcome for the actor is the one that are chosen (Alexander Wendt 2001). 
35 John J. Mearsheimer. 2001. p 17 
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is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain 
to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large 
absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how 
the other will use its increased capabilities”
36. 
 
Waltz argument is that War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relations to 
possible gains. Deterrent is not a theory; Instead deterrent policies derive from structural 
theory, which emphasizes that the units of an international-political system must tend to 
their own security as best they can. In contrasts to dissuasion by defence, dissuasion by 
deterrence operates by frightening a state out of attacking, not because of the difficulty of 
launching an attack but because the expected reaction of the opponent may result in one’s 
own severe punishment. Deterrent depends on fear, and to create fear nuclear weapons are 
the best possible means37. 
 
2.4. Neoliberalism  
The liberal tradition in International Relations is closely connected with the emergency of 
the modern liberal state. Liberal philosophers, beginning with John Lock in the seventeenth 
century, saw great potential for human progress in modern civil society and capitalist 
economy, both of which could flourish in states, which guaranteed individual liberty. 
Liberals generally take a positive view of human nature. They have great faith in human 
reasons and they are convinced that rational principles can be applied to international 
affairs. Liberals recognize that states are self-interested and competitive up to a point. But 
they also believe that states share many interests and can thus engage in collaborative and 
cooperative social action, which results in greater benefits for the states involved38. The 
neoliberal approach stresses the importance of international institutions in reducing the 
inherent conflict that realists assume in an international system. The reasoning is based on 
the core liberal idea that seeking long-term mutual gains is often more rational than 
maximizing individual short-term gains. The neoliberal approach differs from earlier liberal 
approaches in that it concedes to realism several important assumptions, among them, that 
states are unitary actors rationally pursuing their self-interests, and that they operate within 
an anarchical structure. They try to show that even in a world of unitary rational states the 
                                                 
36 Duncan Snidal. 1991 p 703  
37 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2003. p 5, 154 
38 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen. 2003. p 106  
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realist pessimism about international cooperation is not valid. States can create mutual rules, 
expectations, and institutions to promote behaviour that enhance the possibilities for mutual 
gains. Neoliberals like Robert O. Keohane have used the game theory of Prisoners 
Dilemma39 to illustrate the neoliberal argument that cooperation is possible, even within an 
anarchical structure. In the game of Prisoners Dilemma each player can gain by individually 
defecting, but both lose when both defect. The narrow, self–serving behaviour of each 
player leads to a bad outcome for both; one they could have improved by cooperation. The 
dilemma can be resolved if the game is played over and over again, where states deal with 
each other in repeated interactions40.  Keohane is the author of the so called contractual (or 
functional) theory of regimes, which focuses on the institutionalization of a growing sector 
of international behaviour and for which the label “neoliberal institutionalism” has come 
into use41. Functionalism means that the functions performed by institutions help us 
understand the creation, maintenance and evolution of international regime. Understanding 
the functions of regimes, therefore, is also holding the key to explaining their very 
existence. Since world politics lack authoritative governmental institutions, and is 
characterised by pervasive uncertainty, a major function of international regimes is to 
facilitate the making of mutually beneficial agreements among states, so that the structural 
condition of anarchy does not lead to complete “war of all against all”, meaning that 
international regimes help to make governments’ expectations consistent with one another. 
Regimes are therefore developed in part because actors in world politics believe that with 
such arrangements they will be able to make mutually beneficial agreements that would 
otherwise be difficult or impossible to attain42. 
 
2.5. Constructivism 
Constructivism is characterised by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as 
material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually 
constitutive relationship between agents and structures, and take a more sociological than 
                                                 
39 The Prisoners Dilemma is a type of non-zero sum game where the players may choose from cooperation or 
defection. In this game the only concern of each individual player is maximising his own payoffs, without any   
concern for the other player's payoff. Cooperation is strictly dominated by defection; this means that no matter 
what the other player does, one player will always gain a better payoff by playing defect. Since in any situation 
playing defect is more beneficial than playing cooperation, all rational players will play defect, all things been 
equal. So the equilibrium is for both players to defect even if the individual award would be Pareto-efficient if 
they both chose to cooperate (This definition is from the internet cyclopaedia, wikipidia). 
40 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2005. p 101-102 
41 Hasenclever. Mayer. Rittberger. 1997. p 28 
42 Robert O. Keohane in Stephen D. Krasner. 1983. p 148, 150 
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economic approach to systemic theory. On this basis, they have argued that states are not 
structurally or exogenously given but constructed by historical contingent interactions. 
Constructivism is like neorealism and neoliberalism a structural theory of the international 
system that makes the following core claims: (1) States are the principal units of analysis for 
political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than 
material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these 
social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic 
politics43. Where neorealist and constructivist structuralism really, differ, however, is in 
their assumption about what structure is made of. Neorealist think it is made only of a 
distribution of material capabilities, whereas constructivists think it is also made of social 
relationships. Social structures have three elements; shared knowledge, material resources, 
and practises44. Social identities and interests are always in process during interaction. They 
may be relatively stable in certain contexts, in which case it can be useful to treat them as 
given. However, this stability is an ongoing accomplishment of practises that represents self 
and others in certain ways, not a given fact about the system. Identification is a continuum 
from negative to positive. In the absence of positive identification, interests will be defined 
without regard to the other, who will instead be viewed as an object to be manipulated for 
the gratification of the self. Constructivism refers to positive identification with the welfare 
of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the self, rather than 
independent. Because of corporate needs for differentiation, this identification would rarely 
bee complete, but to the extent that it exist, there will be an empathic rather than 
instrumental or situational interdependency between self and other. This is a basis for 
feeling of solidarity, community, and loyalty and thus for collective definitions of interests. 
Having such interests does not mean that actors are irrational or no longer calculate costs 
and benefits, rather, they do so on a higher level of social aggregation45. Constructivists are 
critical of rationalist theories of international politics, and contrasts with rationalism in three 
important respects. First, where rationalists assume that actors are atomistic egoists, 
constructivists treat them as deeply social. In the sense that their identities are constituted by 
the institutionalised norm, values and ideas of the social environment in which they act. 
Second, instead of treating actors` interests as exogenously determined, as given prior to 
social interaction, constructivists treat interests as endogenous to such interaction, as a 
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consequence of identity acquisition, as learnt through processes of communication, 
reflection on experience, and role enactment. Third, while rationalists view society as a 
strategic realm, a place where actors rationally pursue their interests, constructivists see it as 
a constitutive realm, the site that generates actors as knowledgeable social and political 
agents, the realm that makes them who they are46. 
 
2.6. Definition of Regimes and Regime Theories 
When John Ruggie first introduced the concept of international regimes to international 
relations theory in 1975, he defined regimes as "a set of mutual expectations, rules and 
regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which have been 
accepted by a group of states"47. A wider and the most used definition was presented in 
1983 by Stephen D. Krasner, where he defined international regimes as;  "sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of 
facts, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights 
and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision 
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice"48. When it comes to explaining regimes as international institutions, we often 
separate between three theories, the power based, interest based, and knowledge based. In 
fact we can talk about three different schools of thought within the study of international 
regimes corresponding to these three approaches: realists, who emphasize how power and 
considerations of relative power position affect the content, and circumscribe the 
effectiveness and robustness, of international regimes. Neoliberals stress self-interest as a 
motive for cooperation among states and likewise for the creation of, and compliance with, 
international regimes. Constructivists point out that both the perception of interests and the 
meaning of power capabilities is dependent on actor’s causal and social knowledge49. On 
the one side are the realist and neoliberals, which see action as driven by logic of anticipated 
consequences (rationality) and prior preferences. On the other side are constructivists who 
see action as driven by logic of appropriateness (norms) and sense of identity50. 
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2.7. Power Based  
Although neorealism envisions a world that is fundamentally competitive, cooperation 
between states do occur, it is sometimes difficult to achieve, however, and always difficult 
to sustain. Nevertheless, cooperation among states has its limits, mainly because it is 
constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of 
cooperation can eliminate. However they believe that those rules reflect states calculation of 
self-interests based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful 
states, in the system create and shape institutions so they can maintain their share of world 
power, or even increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially, arenas for acting out 
power relationship.51. Meaning that international institutions are shaped and limited by the 
states that found and sustain, them and have little independent effect. While neorealists like 
Waltz and Mearsheimer have argued that the international regimes is a reflection of the 
most powerful states in the system. They have not provided a thorough explanation of how 
these international regimes work, so by supplementing neorealist with the more general 
realist theory of hegemonic stability, we will be able to create a framework on how 
international regimes may function from a neorealist perspective.  
 
The theory of hegemonic stability begins with recognition of the intensely competitive 
nature of international relations. The security and political interests of states are primary and 
determine the international context within which economic forces must operate. The origin 
of the hegemonic stability theory can be traced back to Kindleberger’s statement that “for 
the world economy to be stabilized there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer”. The theory 
in its simplest form, links the existence of effective international institutions to a unipolar 
(hegemony) configuration of power in the issue-area in question. The theory claims that the 
existence of a hegemonic power is a necessary condition although it is not a sufficient 
condition for the development of stable international institutions. Meaning that without the 
existence of a hegemonic power international cooperation in trade, monetary, and most 
other matters in international affairs becomes exceptionally difficult, if not impossible to 
achieve 52. A hegemon according to Mearshimer53 “is a state that is so powerful that it 
dominates all the other states in the system. No other state has the military wherewithal to 
put up a serious fight against it. In essence, a hegemony is the only great power in the 
                                                 
51 John J. Mearsheimer. 1994-95. p 9, 13 and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2000. p 26 
52 Robert Gilpin. 1987. p 85 
53 John J. Mearsheimer. 2001. p 40 
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system”. The existence of a hegemonic power doesn’t necessarily mean that it is a 
domination of the entire world; according to Mearsheimer54 we can separate more narrowly 
between global hegemons, which dominates the world, and regional hegemons, which 
dominates distinct geographical areas.  
 
The theory claims that the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor in international 
politics leads to collective desirable outcomes for all states in the international system55. 
They may use coercion to enforce adherence to rules; or they may relay largely on positive 
sanctions, the provision of benefits to those who cooperate. Both hegemonic powers and the 
smaller states may have incentives to collaborate in maintaining a regime, the hegemonic 
power gains the ability to shape and dominate its international environment, while providing 
a sufficient flow of benefits to small and middle powers to persuade them to comply56. 
According to the theory of hegemonic stability we would assume that there must be a 
sufficient incentive from the hegemonic power to willingly provide a public good, and also 
to bear the full costs of its provision for cooperation to occur. This outcome will be most 
likely when a single state, a hegemonic power, is sufficiently large relative to all others 
states in the system that it will capture a share of the benefit of the public good larger than 
the entire cost of providing it. States may enjoy the collective goods provided by the 
hegemonic power regardless of whether or not they contribute to the maintenance of the 
good, often referred to as the “free rider” problem. The hegemonic power must prevent 
cheating and free riding, by enforcing the rules of the regime and encourage others to share 
the costs of maintaining the system57.   
 
Cooperation is more difficult to achieve when state are attuned to relative-gains logic, rather 
than absolute-gains logic. This is because states concerned with absolute gains need only 
make sure that the pie is expanding and that they are getting at least some portion of the 
increase, while states that worry about relative gains must care also about how the pie is 
divided. Such relative gains concerns can keep states from embarking on, or continuing to 
support, cooperative ventures with others, even when cheating is not a problem58. 
Moreover, improving one's short- or long-term prospects of survival is not the only motive 
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that makes states attentive to how well their partners do compared to themselves. States also 
fear that their partners may be able to turn their relative advantage into greater bargaining 
power in the issue-area in question and beyond. This, in turn, would enable them to drive 
even better bargains up to a point where the relatively disadvantaged partner's capacity for 
autonomous choice, at least in the issue-area at hand, may be seriously hampered. Thus 
states seek to avoid relative losses, not only because survival is their fundamental goal, but 
also because they value their independency and autonomy59. Relative gains concerns tend to 
be suppressed when the states in question share a common adversary or when the power 
difference between them is so large that no conceivable gap in pay-offs from cooperation is 
likely to affect their relative position as a noticeable degree. States whose power base is 
generally shrinking tend to be more sensitive to relative losses then rising hegemonic 
powers60. This realist analysis of the cooperation problem does not only suggest a 
hypotheses about the likelihood of states working together for mutual advantage, but also 
one about the form that any collaboration that might be achieved is likely to take: choosing 
defensive positional aims create a tendency for states to cooperate on terms that ensure a 
balanced distribution of gains, i.e. one which "roughly maintains pre-cooperation balances 
of capabilities". Since such a distribution of benefits from cooperation often does not result 
"automatically", states regularly offer side-payments or other concessions to dissipate 
otherwise disadvantaged partners' concerns about relative losses. Conversely, if gains are 
unable and attempts to redress this problem are not made or fail to take effect, ongoing 
cooperative ventures are likely to come under stress or even break down altogether61. Once 
the (unipolar) power structure that underlies a given regime dissolves, the regime itself, is 
bound to collapse or turn into an ineffective cluster of norms and rules which are violated 
whenever states perceive this to be in their best interest. Hegemonic decline can result either 
from the absolute decline of the dominant actor or from positive but differential growth 
rates through which secondary powers "catch up" to a former leader62. Another factor that 
might lead to the dissolvent of the regime, is if other states begin to regard the actions of the 
hegemon as self-serving and contrary to their own political and economic interests63 
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2.7.1. Prediction of theory 
Realist’s explanation for nuclear acquisition is based on the structure of the system, to 
protect their own survival in an anarchic structure states are concerned of military capability 
relative to other states. States formulate their security policies, on the basis of worst-case 
assumptions and are wary of the time required for them to catch up with the technology and 
military capability of other states. The result is a constant effort by states to increase their 
capability to defend themselves and deter aggression. Therefore realists believe that states 
would not ordinarily forgo their rights to manufacture weapons that may deter potential 
adversaries and increase their own power and prestige. According to realism the NPT needs 
the presence of a hegemonic power. It should be willing and capable of providing benign 
politics such as economic rewards, or coercive policies such as economic and military 
sanctions, to keep subordinate states from acquiring nuclear weapons64. Thus, the 
explanatory factor for the degree of success or failure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
treaty according to the theory of hegemonic stability will be explained by the presence of a 
hegemonic power in the international society that has an interest to prevent nuclear 
proliferation and benign and coercive means to do so. Even if the regime is not effective it 
may be robust as long as it is in the interest of the hegemonic power to maintain it, based on 
its coercive and non-coercive power.  
 
2.8. Interest-Based 
According to Keohane, international cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour 
to the actual or anticipated preference of others through a process of policy coordination. 
Whit this definition in mind, we can differentiate among cooperation, harmony, and discord. 
Harmony and cooperation are usually not distinguished clearly from one another. Yet, in the 
study of world politics they should be, because harmony is apolitical. Meaning that under 
harmony no communication is necessary, and no influence needs to be exercised. 
Cooperation, by contrast, is highly political, as somehow patterns of behaviour must be 
altered. This change may be accomplished through negative as well as positive 
inducements. Indeed, strategies that involve treats and punishment, as well as promises and 
rewards, are more effective in attaining cooperative outcomes than those that rely on 
persuasion and good example. Cooperation, therefore, does not imply an absence of 
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conflict. On the contrary, it is typically mixed with conflict and reflects partially successful 
efforts to overcome conflict, real or potential. Cooperation takes place only in situations in 
which actors perceive that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict, not where 
there is harmony. Cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of conflict, but rather as 
a reaction to conflict or potential conflict. Without the spectre of conflict, there would be no 
need to cooperate65. Whether a hegemony exists or not, international regimes depend on the 
existence of patterns of common or complementary interests that are perceived, or capable 
of being perceived by political actors. The incentive to form international regimes from a 
neorealist perspective depends most fundamentally on the existence of shared interests. This 
makes joint action to produce joint gains rational66. Ronald Coase argued that the presence 
of externalities alone does not necessarily prevent effective coordination among 
independent actors. Under certain conditions, declared Coase, bargaining among these 
actors could lead to solutions that are Pareto-optimal67 regardless of the rules of legal 
liability. The Coase theorem has frequently been used to show the efficiency of bargaining 
without central authority, and it has occasionally been applied specifically to international 
relations. The principle of sovereignty in effect establishes rules of liability that put the 
burden of external affairs on those who suffer from them. The Coase theorem could 
therefore be interpreted, as predicting that problems of collective action could easily be 
overcome in international politics through bargaining and mutual adjustment. Coase 
specified three crucial conditions for this conclusion to hold: (a) a legal framework 
establishing liability for actions, presumably supported by governmental authority, (b) 
perfect information, and (c) zero transaction costs including organization costs and costs of 
making side-payments. If all these key conditions were met in the international society, ad 
hoc agreements would be costless and international regimes unnecessary. On the other 
hand, by inverting the Coase theorem also allows us to analyse international institutions 
largely as a response to problems of property rights, uncertainty, and transaction costs. 
Inverting the Coase theorem provides us therefore with a list of conditions, where at least 
one must apply if regimes are to be of value in facilitating agreements among governments: 
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(a) lack of clear legal frameworks establishing liability for actions, (b) information 
imperfections, and (c) positive transaction costs68.   
 
In international society, according to neoliberalism, all of these conditions are met all of the 
time. World governments does not exist, information is extremely costly and often 
impossible to obtain. Transaction costs, including costs of organization and side-payments, 
are often very high. Yet, the Coase theorem is useful not merely as a way of categorizing 
these familiar problems but because it suggests how international regimes can improve 
actors' ability to make mutually beneficial agreements.  From the deficiency of self-help 
systems, we get a need for international regimes. Insofar as they fill this need, international 
regimes perform the functions of establishing patterns of legal liability, providing relatively 
symmetrical information, and arranging the costs of bargaining to make specific agreements 
more easily. This typology therefore allows us to specify regime functions, as devises to 
make agreements possible, and therefore to understand the demand for international 
regimes. Insofar as international regimes can correct institutional defects in the international 
society along any of these three dimensions, (a) liability, (b) information, and (c) transaction 
costs, they may become efficient devices for the achievement of state purposes. Therefore, 
international regimes are developed in part because actors in world politics believe that with 
such arrangements they will be able to make, mutually beneficial agreements that would 
otherwise be difficult or impossible to obtain. Regimes arise because actors forgo 
independent decision making in order to deal with collective problems. They do so in their 
own self-interests because jointly accessible outcomes are preferable to those that are or 
might be reached independently. It is in their interests mutually to establish arrangements to 
shape their subsequent behaviour and allow expectations to converge, thus solving the 
dilemmas of independent decision-making69. 
 
2.8.1. Prediction of theory 
International regimes, and the institutions and procedures that develop in conjunction with 
them, perform the function of reducing uncertainty and risk according to neoliberalism, by 
linking discrete issues to one another and by improving the quantity and quality of 
information available to participants70. This means that the success of an international 
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regime is based on its capability to deliver quantity and quality of information to the 
member states and hence, reducing the uncertainty in the anarchical structured international 
society. Therefore, the explanatory factor for the degree of success or failure of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation treaty according to interest-based theory of regimes is the quantity and 
quality of information that the regime is capable of producing for its member states. From a 
neoliberal view, there has to be a consensus among the majority of the signatory states for 
the regime to prevail. The will to maintain the regime may come from a shown effect, or it 
may be robust because of the belief in a potential future effect, since regimes are more 
costly to produce than to maintain.  
 
2.9. Knowledge-Based 
Constructivist approaches to the study of international politics stress ideas and knowledge 
as explanatory variables. The constructivists would argue that that the state-egoism 
assumption is problematic because we should not make a priori assumption about state 
identity in anarchy. In other words, by understanding that identities are created through 
interaction, we open the door to systemic change. The constructivist argue that assuming a 
selfish identity and thus a self-help system, is either useful, because it blocks the 
opportunity for systemic change, or accurate because identities are made and not given71.  
 
A constructivist analysis on cooperation would concentrate on how the expectations 
produced by behaviour affect identities and interests. The process of creating institutions is 
one of internalizing new understanding of oneself as well as others, of acquiring new role 
identities, not just of creating external constraints on the behaviour of exogenously 
constituted actors. Unintentionally, the process by which egotists learn to cooperate is at the 
same time a process of reconstructing their interests in terms of shared commitments to 
social norms. Over time, this will tend to transform a positive interdependence of outcomes 
into one of utilities or collective interests organized around the norms in question. These 
norms will resist change because they are tied to actors’ commitment to their identities and 
interests, not merely because of transaction costs. The process of cooperation tends to 
redefine egotistic reasons, even if these were its starting point, by reconstituting identities 
and interests in terms of new intersubjective understandings and commitments72. 
Intersubjective systemic structures consist of the shared understandings, expectations, and 
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social knowledge embedded in international institutions and threat complexes, in terms of 
which states define their identities and interests. Intersubjective structures help determine 
how much “slack” exists in a states system for dynamics of collective identity formation to 
develop. The greater the degree of conflict in a system, the more the states will fear each 
other and defend egotistic identities by engaging in relative gains thinking and resisting the 
factors that might undermine it. Constructivists argue that the demand for regimes depends 
on actors’ perception of international problems, which is, in part, produced by their causal 
and normative beliefs73. A security dilemma according to the theory of constructivism is a 
social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful 
that they make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions. As a result, they 
define their interests in self-help terms. A security community on the other hand is a 
different social structure, one composed of shared knowledge in which states trust one 
another to resolve disputes without war74. According to Alexander Wendt75, the 
international society would be less stable if states applied a logic of consequences to their 
actions. Wendt’s argument is that internalized norms may explain much of the rule abiding 
we observe in international life. Regimes do more than merely manipulate incentives 
affecting the utility calculations of rational actors. They comprise understandings shared by 
the members concerning the rights conduct in circumscribed situations. Not only do they 
prescribe certain actions in defined circumstances, they also serve as commonly used points 
of reference for the determination and the assessment of individual behaviour. International 
regimes therefore can be conceptualised as principles and shared understandings of 
desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour76.  
 
2.9.1 Prediction of theory 
Anarchy may be a self-help system; opposite it may also be a collective security system that 
is not self-help in any sense. The resulting logic depends on conceptions of self and others; 
anarchy of friends is different from one of enemies. If states may threaten each other's 
security in their first encounter, because of unit-level factors, then competitive dynamics 
may ensue, generating egoistic conceptions of self. New anarchies may even be particularly 
susceptible to such outcomes. However, if states bring a friendly or respectful attitude to 
such an encounter, then different dynamics of identity formation may ensue. Anarchic 
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structures explain little by themselves: the importance is the identity and interests that states 
brings to their interactions and the subsequent impact of the latter on the former. Self-help 
presupposes self-interest; it does not explain it77. The explanatory factor for the degree of 
success or failure of the NPT according to constructivism is the ability and willingness by 
states to escape the security dilemma. They may do so by creating a new identity by a 
willingness to follow the norms and rules of the regime, and showing a collective interest in 
a nuclear-free international society, thus reducing the fear among states for a potential 
nuclear conflict. By changing identity, foes may become friends and the need for nuclear 
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Chapter 3: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 
In this chapter I will give a brief historical presentation of the establishment of the NPT, 
before I look closer at the different articles of the treaty.  
 
3.1 History of the NPT 
In August 1945, two nuclear bombs known as "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" were dropped 
over the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the order of former U.S. President Harry 
S. Truman. The nuclear bombs were a result of the Manhattan Project created in August 
1942. Soon after using the bomb, Truman began wrestling with how to control it. "The hope 
of civilization," he said in his message to Congress in October 1945, "lies in international 
arrangements looking to the possible renunciation of the use and development of the atomic 
bomb". By 1946, he had worked out a detailed plan that included many of the nuclear non-
proliferation proposals still debated today. This included a ban on the production of any new 
weapons or the fissile material for weapons, international control of nuclear fuel, a strict 
inspection regime, and complete nuclear disarmament78. Seven years later on December 8 
1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented an imaginative nuclear initiative to the 
United Nations General Assembly, known as the “Atoms for Peace” speech. Eisenhower 
began his speech by warning of two impending atomic realities. First he advised that the 
means to produce nuclear weapons, then possessed by only a few states, would eventually 
spread to other countries, possibly all others. The speech contained many of the most 
important elements of today’s nuclear non-proliferation strategy: the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), the concept of nuclear safeguards, and most importantly, the norm 
of nuclear non-proliferation79. During the first decade of the "nuclear age", three countries 
developed nuclear weapons: the United States in 1945, Soviet Union in 1949, and United 
Kingdom in 1952. The next decade two new countries joined the "nuclear club", France in 
1960, and China in 1964. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opened for signatures on 
July 1, 1968. When the treaty was signed, it divided the signatory states into two different 
categories, the states recognised as "nuclear weapons states" (NWS) and the states 
recognised as the "non-nuclear-weapons states" (NNWS). The states that fall under the 
category as NWS are the five countries that tested their nuclear weapons prior to January 1, 
1967: the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China. When the treaty 
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was first signed it was originally valid for a period of twenty-five years. On May 11, 1995 
more than 170 countries attended the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York, 
the result of the conference was an extension of the NPT for an indefinite duration and 
without conditions80.  
 
3.2. Text of the Treaty 
The NPT is divided into three different pillars. These are non-proliferation, the right to 
peaceful use of nuclear technology, and disarmament. These pillars make the fundamental 
value of the treaty and act as the guidelines for the signatory states. Underlying the non-
proliferation regime is the major incentive to acquire nuclear weapons based on a national 
security concerns. To eliminate such incentives, the concerns must be allayed. In the case of 
many countries the concerns have been met through a nuclear umbrella offered by alliances. 
Other countries have been given a measure of assurance by the declarations made by NWS 
in the UN Security Council, who have promised abstaining from use of nuclear weapons 
against NNWS81. The NPT is based on the consideration of the devastation that would 
befall all mankind by a nuclear war. Consequently there is a strong impetus to avert the 
danger of nuclear war and thereby safeguard the security of nations. It is felt that, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war.  
 
Under Article I and Article II of the treaty what can be viewed as the non-proliferation 
pillar. The NWS agree not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or any 
other nuclear explosives devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, 
or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises, or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices. And each NNWS party to the treaty undertakes not to 
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
82
. The separation between NWS and NNWS 
makes the NPT a asymmetrical regime because while the treaty places similar obligations 
on both NWS and NNWS to prevent the proliferation of these weapons, it allows the five 
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recognised NWS legally permitted to be in the possession of nuclear weapons, something 
that are denied all other parties to the treaty.  
 
In most cases where there is a lack of incentive for states to participate in international 
institutions it may be necessary to create an incentive by using the "carrot" principle. The 
carrot for NNWS to sign the NPT is basically in return of foregoing the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons as long as the nuclear states commit to provide them with nuclear 
technology suitable for the development of nuclear energy industry. Creating an incentive to 
join the treaty in exchange of nuclear energy capability that the majority of the member 
states most likely would not be able to achieve other vice. Countries that build their first 
nuclear reactor usually need outside technical help. The only countries that have built their 
first reactor entirely unaided were the US, Soviet Union, and France83. Article IV of the 
treaty gives the member states the inalienable right to develop research, production, and use 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with 
Articles I and II of the NPT. All the parties to the treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the 
right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific 
and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Member states of 
the NPT in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with 
other states or international organizations to the further development of the applications of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of the NNWS party to the 
treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world
84
. The 
regime and the IAEA are put in a difficult double role where it is supposed to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and at the same time promote and provide the use of civil 
nuclear energy. There is no guarantee that the help that has been received by states from 
IAEA to produce nuclear energy for civil purposes will later not be used to produce nuclear 
weapons. 
 
The disarmament pillar is mainly based in Article VI of the treaty. Where each of the party 
to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating 
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at any early date and to nuclear disbarment, and on a 
treaty on general and complete disbarment under strict and effective international contro
85
l. 
                                                 




According to the disarmament pillar of the treaty, NWS are not strictly required to disarm 
and destroy all their nuclear weapons; rather they are required to negotiate in good faith the 
elimination of nuclear arsenals in their possessions.  
 
3.3. Safeguards and the UN Security Council 
A regime's transparency depends on the purpose for which the regime seeks information, 
i.e. the demand for information and the incentives and capacity of relevant actors to provide 
that information as well as the strategies the regime adopts to increase transparency86. Ever 
since IAEA was founded in 1957, this safeguard system has provided an indispensable 
instrument for nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of 
this, the NPT makes it mandatory for all NNWS parties to conclude comprehensive 
safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all 
of their sources or special fissionable material. Article III of the NPT provides that each 
NNWS party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to 
be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statue of the IAEA and 
the agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of 
it obligations assumed under the treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear 




IAEA has no means in itself to force states to abide by the rules of the NPT. It was 
established independently from the United Nations under its own international treaty but its 
relationship with the UN is regulated by a special agreement between the two institutions. 
Article III of the agreement obligates, the IAEA to report to the Security Council and 
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Chapter 4: Case Studies 
  
Explaining the dynamics of nuclear acquisition and non-acquisition has significance for 
foreign policy and international relations theory. In the policy realm, non-proliferation goals 
can be achieved only if we understand what causes states to acquire or forgo nuclear 
weapons88. In this chapter, my aim is to look at different empirical cases regarding nuclear 
proliferation and disarmament. To be able to establish a degree of goal achievement, we 
need first to look at how the NPT as a regime has been able to directly or indirectly 
contribute to nuclear non-acquisition of some states, and also why the regime may not be 
able to prevent nuclear acquisition by other states. Regarding nuclear proliferation, I have 
chosen to look closer at eight different countries that I think would help explaining the 
dynamics of nuclear acquisition and non-acquisition. It is further necessary to look at the 
work conducted in the five recognized NWS towards the goal of Article VI of the treaty and 
reduction in their nuclear stockpiles. Concerning disarmament, I will look at different 
bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreements between the United States and Russia.  
 
The first two cases to be presented are Argentina and Brazil. The reason why I examined 
two states is because they are all relatively large powers with the technical and economical 
capability to acquire nuclear weapons.  My third case is Egypt who at one point tried to 
pursue nuclear weapons, and has only enjoyed a cold peace with its nuclear neighbour. 
However, they have all chosen to abstain from nuclear weapons, being examples of why 
states choose non-acquisition. The fourth state I examined is South Africa. South Africa was 
the first state to develop and dismantle a nuclear arsenal. Coming fifth and sixth, I have 
chosen India and Pakistan even if they are not members of the NPT because along with 
Israel, they are the only states that have not signed the NPT. In 1998 they both developed 
nuclear weapons, and exemplify why states choose nuclear acquisition. North Korea, 
became the first and only state to leave the NPT in 2003, in pursuit of nuclear weapons, and 
is the seventh case. My last case is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran has been accused by 
the international society, of having s secret nuclear weapons program because of its 
extensive work on uranium enrichment program. Iran on the other side has consistently 
claimed that its efforts are only intended to serve peaceful purposes.  
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One of the main purposes of the NPT is the reduction of nuclear weapons in the 
international society. According to Article VI, each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, with complete disarmament as the 
ultimate goal. Regarding cases that represent the nuclear disarmament, I have chosen too 
study four bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreements between the United States and 
Russia. The four treaties are the START I, START II, SORT, and the ABM Treaty. To the 
best of my knowledge, these were the only ones, except from the NPT, where there were 
arms reduction agreements among the five NWS. Neither was I able to discover the 
existence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements among the five NWS, except those 
between the US and Russia.  
 
4.1. Argentina  
The history of the Argentine nuclear energy program, the oldest and most sophisticated in 
Latin America, is one of slow but steady progress marked largely by stability, 
professionalism, and the quest for energy interdependence89. In 1967 Argentina signed the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, also known as the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco90, but did not ratify it at the time91. During the 1970s and much of the 1980s, 
Argentina was one of a handful countries suspected of wanting to acquire nuclear weapons. 
The starting point of atomic energy development was established in 1950 of the Comision 
Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA). Although no specific weapons program was 
authorized, by the 1970s it was apparent that Argentina was developing technology suitable 
for such a program. In 1983, CNEA President Admiral Castro Madero announced that 
Argentina had acquired the technology to enrich uranium92. The rational for acquisition of 
atomic energy facilities and the importance given to this area by successive governments, is 
multi-faced. One primary motive was to reverse Argentina's relative decline from one of the 
world's richest countries in the 1940s to an isolated poor nation that had lost its trading 
position. Competition with Brazil and fear of a possible alliance between Brazil and the US 
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also encouraged Argentine rulers to pursue a nuclear program. The Argentineans did not 
fear an attack by any of their neighbours. Instead, they wanted to obtain military equality 
with Brazil and preponderance over Chile in order to maintain a balance of power in the 
region and to prevent any politico-military alliance between these two countries93. In 
January 1994, Argentina acceded to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and accepted IAEA inspections 
of all its nuclear activities. The same year, it joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group, accepting 
restrictions on the kind of nuclear technology it could export. Argentina joined the NPT on 
February 10, 199594 
 
4.2. Brazil 
Like Argentina, the international community saw Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s as a 
potential nuclear weapon state. These suspicions were spurred by Brazil's competition with 
Argentina to be the first to go nuclear, as well as by its desire for regional leadership and 
international status commensurate with the country’s size, population, and natural 
resources95. Brazil initiated research on nuclear technology as early as 1945 when it signed 
a nuclear co-operation agreement with the United States. With the establishment of military 
rule in 1964, the armed forces began to show interest in nuclear technology for security 
objectives. In 1967, the military-run National Security Council declared that nuclear energy 
would be a permanent national objective, as one of the most important goals in the country's 
national security doctrine96. Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 and ratified it the 
following year but refused to waive the entry-into-force provisions contained in Article 28. 
The treaty’s handling of peaceful nuclear explosions proved a sticking point97. Until the 
early 1970s, Brazil had a modest nuclear program, but in June 1975, Brazil and West 
Germany signed an $ 80 billion agreement that provided Brazil with complex fuel-cycle 
technology and two power reactors. This would be more than ample to produce quantities of 
plutonium sufficient for a half-dozen or more nuclear weapons a year. Although the 
agreement provided for more stringent international inspections than the standard IAEA 
arrangements, it was feared, especially by the United states, that the uranium-enrichment 
and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities could provide Brazil with weapons grade materials 
that it could divert to a future weapons program. International suspicions intensified as 
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Brazil's nuclear intentions became clouded in secrecy when the military began a parallel 
program in 197598. In 1990, Brazil renounced its secret program and began a series of steps 
towards binding non-proliferation commitments. A significant milestone on the non-
proliferation path came in 1994, when Brazil brought into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 




Egypt has fought several wars and enjoyed only a "cold peace" with a neighbour that 
possesses both nuclear weapons and a significant edge in conventional military capability. It 
was one of the first third world countries to embark on a civil nuclear program. Egypt has 
trained a large number of capable nuclear scientists, and had talked frequently about 
pursuing an ambitious nuclear power program. Yet, while Egypt seemed to fit the profile of 
a country with a reasonable strong likelihood of pursuing nuclear weapons, there are few if 
any signs that it is headed in that direction100. Egypt’s formal entry into the nuclear field 
came in 1955 with the creation of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA). The 
motivation at the time was apparently peaceful, to enable Egypt to reap economic and other 
benefits from its new and promising technology. The Egyptian nuclear programs early 
concentration on civilian applications shifted toward a more conscious interest in the 
military option in response to concerns about Israel’s nuclear intentions101. During the early 
1960s, the Egyptian government through several steps, boosted its budget for nuclear 
programs, stepped up its efforts to recruit and train nuclear scientists, approached a wide 
range of countries for assistance, examined prospects for mining thorium and uranium in 
Egypt, and explored elements of the nuclear fuel cycle that could eventually enable it to 
produce fissile material for nuclear weapons102. Several attempts were apparently made 
during the 1960s to purchase nuclear weapons or weapons technology from the Soviet 
Union and China, but the requests were denied103. Egypt’s crushing defeat in the Six Day 
War of June 1967 was a critical turning point in its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The 
loss of oil from the Sinai, the closure of the Suez Canal, and the decrease in foreign 
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assistance in the aftermath of the war had a devastating impact on the Egyptian economy. 
Consequently, funding for the nuclear program was frozen104. In 1979, Egypt and Israel 
signed a peace treaty. Although it did not include an Israeli105 commitment to give up 
nuclear weapons or sign the NPT, it resulted in a strong bilateral relationship with the 
United States. This was perhaps of greater importance to Egypt. For about a quarter century, 
U.S.-Egyptian relations had been strained by Egypt’s close political ties, and arms supply 
relationship with the Soviet Union, Egypt’s belligerency toward Israel, and its prominent 
position in the Non-Aligned Movement106. The connection with the United States, from that 
time onwards, has brought benefits to Egypt that go well beyond material support, both 
economic and military. Egypt’s role as America’s partner in the Arab-Israeli peace process, 
often as Washington’s trusted agent in dealing with the Arab world, has reinforced Egypt’s 
standing in the Middle East and elsewhere. The relationship has also had important payoffs 
for Egyptian security107. Despite the narrowing of options, Egypt has not completely closed 
off all future paths to nuclear weapons. Even today, if Egypt makes the political decision to 
acquire nuclear weapons, it might succeed because it has the necessary scientific talent. In 
case Egypt would be prepared to make significant sacrifices in terms of other national 
priorities, it would be able to find the economic resources to support a nuclear weapons 
program. Needless to say, this would not be easy, quick, cheap, or without high risk. Egypt 
currently lacks the facilities and expertise to produce fissile material108.  
 
4.4. South Africa 
South Africa was a neutral power in the 1970s and 1980s that clandestinely built a small 
nuclear arsenal, and then voluntarily dismantled it. South Africa benefited in its nuclear 
pursuit from its alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1940s and 
1950s109. In March 24, 1993 before a special joint session of the South African parliament 
and a national radio audience, President F.W. de Klerk disclosed, "At one stage South 
Africa did develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability, of seven nuclear fission devices." 
He explained, "Early in 1990, final effects was given to decisions that all the nuclear 
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devices should be dismantled and destroyed." According to de Klerk, "All the hardware and 
design information was destroyed" by the time South Africa, signed the NPT in July 1991. 
De Klerk's announcement provided official confirmation of what many had long suspected: 
that South Africa had surreptitiously acquired a small nuclear arsenal110. However, no one 
would have predicted that after building these devices, South Africa would become the first 
and only example of nuclear "rollback," voluntarily and unilaterally dismantling its nuclear 
arsenal111. South African scientists had demonstrated the feasibility of nuclear uranium 
enrichment in 1967 and the country was developing an increasingly sophisticated defence 
industry. Confronted with growing domestic, regional, and global treats and possessing the 
capability to build nuclear weapons in 1970, the South African government opted to reject 
the NPT and to pursue a nuclear arsenal112. Extensive nuclear embargoes and boycotts were 
imposed on South Africa from the mid-1970s. These embargoes were inefficient in 
economic terms and they were seen by South Africa as anti-apartheid bullying rather than as 
being selectively targeted against the nuclear weapons program113.  
 
South Africa has been a pioneer in nuclear research and uranium production. As a result, it 
sat on the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency until 1977 when it 
was expelled for covert nuclear activities. It began construction of an unsafeguarded pilot 
uranium-enrichment plant in 1971 at Valindaba outside Pretoria. Here it began producing 
enriched uranium in 1977, its decision to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium was 
driven partly by U.S. sanctions. The Carter administration in 1977 as part of its global non-
proliferation policy, decided to suspend the U.S. contract to provide South Africa with low-
enriched uranium, unless they acceded to the NPT114. After Portugal withdrew from their 
colonies in southwest Africa in 1975, a lot of the former colonies choose to turn to 
communism. The same year the Soviet Union started providing aid to the Marxist regime in 
Angola, and Cuban troops were deployed to support the regime against South African-
backed rebels. According to de Klerk, the nuclear weapons were built to provide “a limited 
nuclear deterrent capability,” necessitated by “a Soviet expansionist threat in Southern 
Africa, as well as prevailing uncertainty concerning the designs of the Warsaw Pact 
members”. Considering South Africa’s relative international isolation it would most likely 
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not be able to rely on outside assistance should it be attacked115? The South African nuclear 
strategy was reportedly to use the bomb as a political tool to achieve its security objectives. 
This strategy involved three phases. In the first phase, the South African government would 
adopt a policy of neither confirming nor denying its nuclear possession to maximize 
uncertainty. The second phase would occur if the country were militarily threatened. South 
Africa would then secretly inform Western governments, especially the United States, of it 
nuclear status to try to persuade it to come to South Africa’s rescue. If such appeals did not 
produce the expected results, South Africa would move on to the third phase, 
acknowledging openly, or testing publicly, a nuclear bomb that would compel the West to 
intervene on South Africa’s behalf. The strategy has been termed "catalytic deterrence," 
based on arousing concerns in the West about South Africa using nuclear weapons in a 
crisis and thereby encouraging the West to intervene to protect it116. As a precursor to 
signing the NPT, which it did in the summer of 1991, South Africa invited the IAEA to 
make on-site inspections. During a series of visits, the South African government permitted 
IAEA personnel unprecedented access for their inspections of HEU facilities and weapon 
production sites117. South Africa formally joined the NPT on July 10, 1991. Not all the 
pieces of the nuclear cores had been melted down and reshaped by this time. This step was 
accomplished by the time it signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA eight weeks later. 
The same month South Africa resumed its seat at the IAEA General Conference for the first 
time in twelve years118.  
 
4.5. India  
Before international nuclear safeguards came into effect, the Canadians sold India a 40-
megawatt research reactor, which started working in 1960. By the early 1970s, India had 
built one of the most sophisticated nuclear programs in the developing world while ensuring 
that many nuclear facilities were not subject to IAEA safeguards. When it became apparent 
that India was violating the agreement it had made with Canada by using the reactor to 
produce plutonium for weapons, Canada stopped its assistance. It took India ten years after 
starting to process plutonium in 1964 before they conducted their first nuclear underground 
test. With the nuclear-power plants India has developed since 1974, it was assumed in 1998 
that it had to have about 400 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, or probably enough to 
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make sixty weapons119.  India became the sixth declared nuclear state in May 1998, when it 
conducted five nuclear tests. The precise number of nuclear weapons India possesses is still 
not known. India is a member of the IAEA, and from 1947 to 1964, it maintained a lofty 
position of demanding universal nuclear disarmament. In contrast to its former lofty 
position, India has refused to sign the NPT, which it views as "discriminatory" and has kept 
a strong opposition against the treaty. India has a long history of rivalry with its neighbours, 
and in 1962, India fought a war with China over boarder disputes, and lost part of the 
Kashmir region to China. India has also fought three wars against its neighbour Pakistan, in 
1947, 1965 and 1971, since its independence from Great Britain in 1947. Animosity 
between the two nations almost led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1987 and 1990. India is 
the world’s most densely populated democracy and wants to be treated as one of the major 
powers in international society120.  
 
4.6. Pakistan 
"If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry. But we will get one of 
our own. We have no alternative". Former Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto121.  
 
Although Pakistan was reported to have developed nuclear weapons capability as early as 
1987, it conducted its first nuclear tests in 1998, following India’s five tests two weeks 
earlier. Pakistan began nuclear energy research in 1955 with the establishment of the 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Until 1971, the nuclear program was largely for 
peaceful purposes, but the defeat in the 1971 war with India set in motion a weapon 
armament of Pakistan’s nuclear program. India’s nuclear test in 1974 increased pressure on 
Pakistan, who did not accept India’s contentions that the test was peaceful and that India did 
not plan a nuclear arsenal. Pakistan’s nuclear plans became more intense when it failed to 
obtain security guarantees from major powers. Outnumbered and outgunned by their much 
larger and wealthier neighbour, nuclear weapons was a vital alternative to ensuring its 
sovereignty and survival. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 strengthened 
Pakistan’s alliance with the United States, which substantially helped its nuclear program. 
During the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the United States supported Pakistan, 
which in turn would funnel military and logistical assistance to the Afghan resistance to 
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counter Soviet influence. In 1981 the U.S. provided Pakistan with a six-year $3,2 billion aid 
package. Later, in 1986, U.S. Congress approved a second assistance package, totalling over 
$ 4 billion122. Following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States 
curtailed its ties with Pakistan and increased pressure on it to stop its nuclear program. The 
loss of U.S. support may have increased Pakistan’s desire for nuclear weapons, helped 
considerably by China, which is believed to have transferred blueprints, enriched uranium, 
and ring magnets for uranium processing and trained Pakistani nuclear engineers123. 
 
4.7. Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
Despite all of its resources, North Korea (DPRK) has been unable to develop economic 
strength. Under the strong dictatorship that has ruled the country since the Korean War, its 
major efforts has been to develop its industrial base transforming a previously agricultural 
country into an industrial nation emphasizing heavy industry and self-sufficiency. Its only 
political relationship has been with other Communist countries, particularly the Soviet 
Union and China. During the 1990s, North Korea found itself more isolated than at any 
other time in its brief history. The Soviet Union, who was North Koreas single largest 
source of advanced military equipment, had been dissolved124. China, North Koreas other 
strategic partner, moved to advance its national interests by engaging in a prosperous trade 
with the Republic of Korea and by allowing the simultaneous admission of both Koreas into 
the United Nations. South Korea skilfully obtained diplomatic recognition from Russia and 
China during this period, but North Korea failed to gain "cross-recognition" from Japan and 
the United States125.  
 
The first reactor that was built in the country, was a small research reactor provided by the 
Soviet Union in 1967. In 1986 North Korea began construction of a 200MW reactor at 
Youngbyon and a 600-800MW reactor near Taechon. Together the two nuclear plants 
produced enough kilograms of plutonium to produce up to forty-five nuclear bombs a year. 
North Korea has good reasons to develop nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes. It needs 
theme as a source of electrical power, having no oil reserves or foreign currency to buy oil. 
In its isolation, North Korea has always wanted to be self-sufficient, and thus chose to 
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develop nuclear reactors that could operate with natural uranium126.  North Korea has been a 
member of the IAEA since 1974, but did not join the NPT until 1985, partially motivated by 
Moscow’s promise of four nuclear power reactors. A safeguard agreement with the IAEA 
should have been signed within eighteen months, by mid-1987, but the DPRK failed to 
conclude the agreements. After the U.S. withdrew their nuclear weapons from the Republic 
of Korea in 1991, the North and the South agreed to make the peninsula a nuclear weapons 
free zone. This "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula", 
stipulated that the two parties would not test, manufacture, produce, introduce, possess, 
store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; ant that they would not possess facilities for nuclear 
reprocessing and uranium enrichment. However problems agreeing on mutual inspections 
agreements almost put a stop for the declaration until the DPRK signed an inspection 
agreement with the IAEA in January 1992. During much of 1992, the IAEA quietly went 
about its business in North Korea. The North responded positively to the IAEA's request for 
permission to visit any site, even ones not listed on the initial declaration. In September, 
inspection of one such site was limited to the visible part of what appeared to be a one-story 
building under military control. It was in fact one of two sites that Pyongyang had tried to 
hide from international inspectors. In late November 1992, the IAEA started to turn up the 
pressure. Hans Blix accused North Korea of not declaring all of its nuclear facilities127. 
Samples taken by the IAEA showed a variety of radioactive by-products that suggested 
numerous instances of reprocessing activities. This means that north Koreas statement 
regarding its past plutonium production were not consistent with what the samples revealed 
and indicated that North Korea possessed more plutonium than it had declared to the IAEA 
and the international society128. On March 12, North Korea declared that it was withdrawing 
from the NPT. Three months later, North Korea suspended its withdrawal from the NPT but 
continued to refuse full inspections129.  
 
The United States and North Korea negotiated for several months during the summer and 
fall of 1994, a process that resulted in the Agreed Framework. The deal consisted of trade 
obligations, provided North Korea agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear 
facilities and eliminate its nuclear weapons capability. The deal was in exchange for 
construction of two modern nuclear power reactors and normal relations with the United 
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States, in addition to oil for use in conventional power plants, ultimately about 500,000 
metric tons a year130. After having been confronted by the United States over its alleged 
uranium enrichment program in 2002, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors from the 
country and removed all IAEA monitoring equipment and seals from its nuclear facilities. 
In January 2003, North Korea once again announced that it was withdrawing from the 
NPT131. Later that year a multilateral dialogue known as The Six-Party Talks132 began in 
Beijing with the aim of ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In return, North 
Korea wanted the United States to stop its hostile policy, stop obstructing North Korea’s 
economic growth, and energy aid133. The nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula continued 
to deteriorate throughout 2006, reaching a low point when North Korea conducted a nuclear 
test. The agreement took a turn in 2007 when North Korea extended invitations to the IAEA 
and opened the door to re-establishing its relationship with the agency. The same year North 
Korea began shutting down and sealing its main nuclear facility at Younbyon under IAEA 
supervision134.    
 
4.8. Iran 
Iran has consistently denied the existence of a nuclear weapons program since the time of 
the Shah. The country has openly admitted its ambitions to acquire nuclear technology and 
Iran has consistently insisted that all of its efforts are intended to serve peaceful purposes. 
Experts have long questioned Iran’s need for nuclear power, given its vast gas and oil 
resources. Iran has since the late 1960s insisted that it will run out of fossil fuel and that 
nuclear power is cost-effective enough in the near term to allow it to profit by freeing up oil 
and gas for export135. The Iranian nuclear program started in 1957 when Iran and the United 
States signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement that laid the groundwork for the 
delivery of a light water research reactor. In 1968 Iran signed the NPT, and its safeguards 
agreement with IAEA entered into force in 1974. The nuclear program came to a halt 
shortly after the 1979 revolution with the establishment of the Islamic Republic. There are 
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strong indications that Ayatollah Khomeini revived Iran’s nuclear weapons program after 
Iraq started to use chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88)136.   
 
On September 16, 2002, Reza Aghazadeh, the president of the Atomic Energy Agency of 
Iran, declared that: "Iran is embarking on a long-term plan, based on the merits of energy 
mix, to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6,000MW...." Later that year, 
the U.S. accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons and demanded that it cooperated with 
the IAEA inspection. Iranian officials denied the accusations and claimed that the country’s 
nuclear facilities were only used for peaceful purposes. The argument has also been raised 
that Iran cannot rely on other countries to supply their nuclear fuel, as they can stop it 
anytime due to political pressure. Iran sees Western efforts to deny them of an indigenous 
fuel cycle as discriminatory and that Iran’s right to do so is documented in article IV of 
NPT137. IAEA experts and inspectors have visited Iran on several occasions. On June 6, 
2003, a preliminary report was published by IAEA that concluded that Iran had failed to 
meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. And Iran was forced to admit to the 
IAEA that it was building a secret installation to enrich uranium, which could be used to 
produce material for nuclear weapons.138 Despite Iran’s earlier commitment to stop all 
enrichment and centrifuge projects, Iran declared on June 27, 2004, that it would continue to 
manufacture centrifuges and experiment with uranium hexafluoride, two of the activities of 
most concern to the IAEA. Iran argued that past U.S. sanctions and other efforts to isolate 
Iran had showed that their national security required self-sufficiency, for their energy needs 
to be met139. In February 2005, the IAEA stated that, "we at the IAEA lack conclusive 
evidence (than proves Iranian nuclear weapons capability). We have yet to se a smoking gun 
that would convict Tehran "
140. However on September 24, 2005, the IAEA found Iran once 
again in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreements, and the UN have since passed 
several Security Council resolutions requesting Iran to stop its enrichment and reprocessing 
related work141.  
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Iran has since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, been viewing the United States as 
an enemy of the state. In October 2001, American troops invaded Afghanistan and 
overthrew the Taliban regime. Two years later, American troops were deployed to Iraq to 
topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. This led to American military presence on Iran’s east and 
west borders. On the east side of Iran are the two nuclear powers Pakistan and India. On its 
northwest side is Israel that Ayatollah Khomeini has declared as Iran's sworn enemy and 
hostility towards Israel has become a central part in the ideological framework of the 
Islamic Republic. Iran does not recognize Israel as a state and sees it as occupying Muslim 
land. Accordingly, Iran has supported anti-Israel organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, 
and Jihad142.  
 
4.9. Arms Control Agreements 
The Antis-Ballistic Missile Treaty143 was a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Soviet 
Union on the limitation of the anti-ballistic missile systems used in defending areas against 
missile-delivery nuclear weapons. The U.S. first proposed the treaty in 1967. The Soviet 
Union did not accept this proposal but in its counter proposal suggested that negotiations on 
ABM defences should include discussions of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. accepted 
this counter proposal on 1 July 1968, at the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. 
On 17 November 1969, the United States and Soviet Union began the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT I) on limiting both ABM defensive systems and strategic nuclear 
offensive systems. Subsequently, the talks were concluded with the two SALT I 
agreements: An Interim Agreement on certain measures limiting strategic offensive arms 
(SALT I) and The ABM Treaty on the limitation of strategic defensive systems, were signed 
on 26 May 1972. The two sides agreed to limit ABM systems and refrain from deploying 
ABM systems for the defence of their countries or an individual region except as provided 
by the Treaty 144.  
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After almost ten years of difficult negotiations, the U.S. and Soviet Union signed the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1991. Under START145, the United States 
and the Soviet Union committed themselves to making reductions in their strategic nuclear 
forces for an initial period of seven years146. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, 
three independent republics, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine147, found themselves with 
strategic nuclear weapons deployed on their territories as well as significant amounts of 
nuclear material. At the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse almost 8000 nuclear weapons 
were deployed in Belarus, in Kazakhstan more than 1,400 strategic nuclear weapons were 
deployed on its territory, as well as a still undisclosed number of tactical nuclear arms. At 
the time of its independence, Ukraine was the deployment site for more than 1,900 strategic 
nuclear weapons. Gaining operational control over those weapons would have made 
Ukraine the world’s third-largest nuclear weapon state after Russia and the United States148. 
On 23 May 1992 the Lisbon Protocol to START I was signed, and made the START I a 
five-nation, multiparty treaty. The protocol and appended presidential letters obliged 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the NPT as NNWS. The parties exchanged 
instruments of ratification at the Budapest summit in 1994. An extensive series of on-site 
inspections and an exchange of geographical and technical data for all systems, with regular 
updates, complemented each party’s national technical means to monitor compliance with 
the treaty149 START I was signed for fifteen years duration and could be extended for 
successive five years period by agreement among the parties. START II that was signed in 
January 1993 complemented rather than replace, the earlier START I, in that the earlier 
Treaty’s provisions remained unchanged unless specifically modified by START II. The 
Treaty established a limit on strategic weapons for each party, with complete reductions of 
all intercontinental ballistic missiles to be implemented in two phases. By the end of phase 
one the United States and Russia were to reduce their total deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads to 3,800-4,250 and by the end of phase two, each party’s total number of total 
number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads should not exceed 3,000-3,500. Initially, 
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phase one was to be fully implemented within seven years of the entry into force of START 
I, and phase two by 1 January 2003. However, these timeframes were extended to the end of 
December 2004 and December 2007. The May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 
(SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, committed the U.S. and Russia to reduce their 
deployed strategic nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 warheads apiece. Unlike past strategic 
arms control agreements between Moscow and Washington, SORT does not specify which 
warheads are to be reduced or how reduction shall be implemented. The Treaty states that 
the two sides will limit their strategic forces in accordance with earlier statements made by 
president George W. Bush and president Vladimir Putin. These vague statements allow each 
side to interpret and implement its reductions as they see fit. In addition SORT has no 
provision for assessing compliance. Instead, the U.S. and Russia have agreed to rely on the 
1991 START I treaty for verifying implementation. However START I expires on 
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
 
In this chapter I will return to my two research questions: To what degree has the Non-
Proliferation Treaty been able to achieve its goals? How can the degrees of success or 
failure connected to goal achievement be explained according to different regime 
theories? As elaborated in chapter 1, the goals of the treaty that will be considered in this 
thesis are prevention of nuclear proliferation and the work of the five NWS to reduce and 
fully disarm their nuclear arsenals. The analysis of my first research question will be 
separated into three sections. In the first section, the eight case countries presented in 
chapter 4 will be analysed. I will look at the role the NPT has played or been unable to  
play, directly or indirectly, in the countries’ decision to either forgo or acquire nuclear 
weapons or such capability. The second section will deal with the extent of the treaty to 
achieve success when it comes to disarmament among the five NWS according to Article 
IV. Finally, the combined degree of goal achievement of the NPT will be discussed.  
 
5.1. Proliferation  
When the NPT was opened for signing in 1968, both Argentina and Brazil opposed the non-
proliferation regime because of its discriminatory nature, and during the 1970s and 1980s 
Argentina and Brazil were eyed by the international society as potential nuclear weapon 
states151. The nuclear supplier’s restriction152 imposed on nuclear commerce, forced 
Argentina and Brazil to either develop advanced technologies indigenously or go without. 
This technology-denial strategy increased the amount of time needed to complete projects 
and raised costs153. Bilateral cooperation between the two neighbours began in 1991 by the 
signing of the Quadripartite Agreement among Argentina, Brazil, ABACC154, and the 
IAEA. As part of its basic undertakings, the agreement stipulated that safeguards would 
apply on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities within their territories. Shortly after 
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this, in 1994, Argentina and Brazil chose to fully implement the revisited Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, which they both had signed in 1967 but refused to ratify. The signings of the two 
agreements were steps towards transparency in their nuclear programs155. Argentina 
formally joined the NPT in 1995, followed by Brazil in 1996.  
 
What was the motive behind the two states decision to cooperate through bilateral 
agreements? The incentive to build nuclear weapons would stem from the ability to gain 
regional dominance, and international prestige. On the other hand, both Argentina and 
Brazil faced significant disincentives to peruse nuclear weapons and would most likely 
benefit more from cooperation on nuclear issues156. There has been no real conflict amongst 
Argentina and Brazil for either to feel threatened by the other, hence development of 
nuclear weapons from either one would most likely harm their security environment more 
than it would benefit it. An arms race would involve enormous costs. Development and 
deployment of nuclear weapons is expensive, and millions or even billions of dollars, are 
required to produce and maintain a nuclear arsenal. In addition to finances, there are usually 
heavy political costs to be paid for nuclear acquisition, along with opportunity costs, 
referring to what the state could otherwise be doing with the resources poured into a nuclear 
weapons program157. As Mitchell Reiss158 has pointed out, nuclear bilateral cooperation will 
benefit both countries, in ways that each one could not have accomplished alone. Through 
bilateral cooperation they were able to increase economic cooperation and reduce mistrust 
and suspicion, thus increasing their own security as well as that of the rest of Latin America. 
They foreclosed a potential nuclear arms race that would have diverted attention, energy, 
and money from more urgent domestic problems. The signing of different agreements, 
including the NPT by Buenos Aires and Brasilia, provided a symbolic effect on their 
dedication to support the different treaties and agreements and the work on non-
proliferation and adhere to non-acquisition of nuclear weapons and continue to maintain a 
nuclear free Latin America. The decision by Argentina and Brazil stemmed from bilateral 
cooperation, rather than international pressure. NPT in addition to the Quadripartite 
Agreement and the treaty of Tlatelolco has provided a framework for the possibility to 
increase cooperation, reduce mistrust and suspicion, improve security, and provide 
economical benefits.  
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After the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, Egypt’s nuclear weapons program was put 
on ice. The peace treaty ended in a robust bilateral relationship between Egypt and the U.S., 
including an agreement of $2 billion annually in economic and military assistance to Egypt. 
This created a strong incentive for Cairo to refuse the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In 
addition to economic development, and close ties with the U.S., two other factors may have 
contributed to its incentive: regional leadership and stability and peace in the region159. 
Egypt has become highly dependent on American aid. Should Egypt decide to reconsider its 
nuclear choice and restart its pursuit of nuclear weapons, it would most likely not be able to 
do so without generating a powerful international reaction, and most likely jeopardise its 
economic and diplomatic ties with the U.S.160. Because Egypt is vulnerable to external 
sources, the country has been under pressure to "play by the rules" of the international 
community, including those of nuclear non-proliferation161. Egypt signed the NPT in 1968 
and ratified the treaty in 1981. It became a subject to safeguards and inspections by the 
IAEA, making it less likely for Egypt to procure the necessary equipment, materials, and 
technology without raising red flags and being detected162. Egypt has become a strong 
supporter of a nuclear weapons free Middle East during the last decades. However, at the 
NPT Review and Extension Conference in April and May of 1995, Egypt took the position 
that it could not support making the NPT permanent unless Israel took concrete steps 
towards joining the treaty163. Regardless of international pressure, Israel has maintained its 
nuclear weapons capability. Under current circumstances, Egypt seems likely to be prepared 
to continue tolerating the nuclear imbalance with Israel and refraining from pursuing a 
nuclear weapons capability of its own164. Indeed the most plausible path to an Egyptian 
weapons program would require the combination of several elements. The unravelling of 
the peace with Israel, a nuclear-armed Iran, the fraying of U.S.-Egyptian ties, and lowering 
of the perceived penalties associated with a country going nuclear165.  
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Among the states that have built nuclear weapons, South Africa was the first country to 
dismantle a small nuclear arsenal acquired during the 1970s and 1980s. This took place in 
1991. The South African nuclear weapons program sprang from the security environment in 
Southern Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, characterized by extended conflicts and 
enduring rivalries combined with near-isolation inflicted by the international society. South 
Africa’s nuclear weapons may be regarded as a political tool. Pretoria never confirmed nor 
denied the possession of nuclear weapons creating uncertainty among its rivals166. In 1988 
South Africa, Cuba, and Angola formally agreed to Namibia’s independence and the 
withdrawal of Cuban forces, and two years later the end of the Cold War and the “fall” of 
communism in The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe led to an implosion of the Soviet 
Union as an expansionist world power in Southern Africa167. The disintegration of 
communism therefore marked a significant change in South Africa’s threat environment and 
when Pretoria decided to rollback its nuclear program, no other nuclear power threatened 
their security.  South Africa also witnessed the beginning of the abolishment of the 
apartheid regime and the racial segregation that had been enforced in the country since 
1948. The possibility of a black majority government inheriting technology or any 
undeclared nuclear material, may have been unsettling, given the traditional support for the 
ANC by Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)168. Pretoria’s decision to 
disarm and sign the NPT may also have been put on the agenda to improve relations with 
the international society. As Liberman and Reiss169 pointed out, former South African 
President De Klerk’s decision to engage in fundamental political change in 1989 opened the 
door to economic and diplomatic opportunities that could be attained more quickly by 
joining the NPT. Even if pressure on Pretoria prior to 1990, did not change their nuclear 
status, an avalanche of new western anti-apartheid sanctions in 1985 and 1986, combined 
with a debt crisis in South Africa, might have put the NPT on the agenda170. The nuclear 
weapons arsenal prevented improved relations with the West, especially the U.S. They 
stood as a barrier to a South African membership in the NPT. This denied Pretoria valuable 
access to peaceful nuclear technology and international cooperation on nuclear energy 
matters and would ensure that foreign customers (i.e., Germany and France) could continue 
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to purchase South African uranium171. It can be argued that dismantlement of both apartheid 
and nuclear weapons, not only one of them, were prerequisites for a better international 
relationship. Three factors could therefore explain Pretoria’s decision to dismantle its 
nuclear weapons: a change in the security environment, the abolishment of the apartheid 
regime, and the need to improve relations with the international society. Which of the tree 
factors was the more important, is difficult to establish. Even if the NPT did not directly 
contribute to Pretoria’s nuclear weapons rollback, it is reasonable to single out the treaty as 
a new agenda had to be found in this respect.  
 
India and Pakistan both openly declared their nuclear weapons capabilities in May 1998 by 
conducting several nuclear tests. India’s motivations to develop nuclear weapons may 
originate from three factors. Firstly, there was a national security perspective, secondly, a 
perceived deterrent against China172, and finally establishment as a major power in the 
international society. India and Pakistan have been locked in a conflict in the region of 
Kashmir since the two countries became independent from the United Kingdom in 1947173. 
Pakistan could have chosen to sign the NPT at an early stage after the Cold War, and 
maintained a good relationship with the U.S. This would certainly have ensured economical 
benefits. Rather, Islamabad chose to maintain its nuclear weapons program. This is the most 
often-cited example of a state that neglects the well being of its people for a nuclear 
weapons capability174. Pakistan’s biggest security threat has been, and still is, India. Most 
likely, Pakistan saw the need to counter balance India’s nuclear and conventional 
superiority as more important than economical benefits. As Toft and Bokhari175 points out, 
it was necessary for Pakistan to begin a nuclear weapons program to counterbalance and 
deter India, even if the economical costs would be tremendous. New Delhi and Islamabad 
have both chosen to stand outside the NPT in exchange for the possession of nuclear 
weapons. India and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons as non-signatory members of the 
NPT. Because they did not violate the treaty, a direct failure of this cannot be argued. On 
the other hand, the NPT have not succeeded in providing an incentive for incorporating 
India and Pakistan into the treaty, and the discriminatory nature of the treaty seems to 
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provide a difficult task for their incorporation Should the two decide to sign the NPT, they 
would enter the treaty as NNWS, since they did not test their nuclear weapons prior to 1967, 
and hence not receive the same rights as the five NWS. The discriminatory statue of NPT 
has been the main reason for India’s refusal to sign it. The NPT can, in practice, not be 
rewritten. Nevertheless, some regulations may need re-interpretation176, if the treaty wants 
to include the only three states that persist as non-members. Even though South Africa has 
demonstrated that a country can reverse course, getting two rivalling countries to dismantle 
advanced nuclear programs in tandem, represents a complex challenge177. Besides, the 
penalties imposed on India and Pakistan was modest and short lived. Although the U.S. 
imposed sanctions in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests, Washington started 
lifting them within six months178. The decision by USA to lift sanctions contributed to 
undermine the NPT, This perilous path may inspire others to develop nuclear weapons 
considering the penalty for doing so may apparently be mild or non-existing.  
 
After the Cold War and the “fall” of communism and the Soviet Union, North Korea has 
found itself isolated from its previous supporters and the international society. Because of 
North Koreas isolation, it is difficult to establish a thorough explanation or rational behind 
the incentive for Pyongyang’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program. Since the end of the 
Korean War in 1953, the U.S. has kept a strong military presence on the Korean peninsula, 
including nuclear weapons. North Korea became a member of the NPT in 1985. But it was 
not until the U.S. agreed to remove the nuclear arsenal from the peninsula in 1991 that 
North Korea decided to implement IAEA Safeguards179. The first IAEA inspections took 
place on May 25, 1992180. The opening of inspections by IAEA created better and important 
transparency and information about the North Korean nuclear facilities and weapons 
program. According to Mitchell Reiss181, IAEA performed a remarkable job of nuclear 
detective work. North Korea’s unwillingness to fully cooperate with the IAEA and its 
announcement of withdrawal in 1993 can be seen as an indicator that DPRK was involved 
in suspicious nuclear activities. Therefore, IAEA provided vital information to the 
international society and removed the opportunity for North Korea to produce a clandestine 
nuclear weapons program. While the U.S.-North Korean relationship improved after the 
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1994 Agreed Framework negotiation, the relationship deteriorated after 2001 and the 
establishment of the Bush doctrine. Many incoming officials had actively opposed the 
Agreed Framework and were highly sceptical of North Korea’s commitment to give up its 
nuclear weapons program182. After having been confronted by the U.S. over its alleged 
uranium enrichment program in 2002, North Korea announced that it was withdrawing from 
the NPT in 2003183. North Korea may have developed its nuclear weapons program as a 
political instrument to be used in achieving diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. and South 
Korea among many other states would most likely go a long way in preventing a North 
Korean nuclear armament and reducing the fear of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The 
Six-Party talks between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the U.S. began 
in 2003 to quell North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. However, the talks broke down in 2005 
and North Korea claimed that it had “manufactured” nuclear weapons as a deterrent to US 
hostility184. This led ultimately to the nuclear test in 2006. Then, in 2007 the Six-Party talks 
resumed. This resulted in agreement by North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons and 
existing nuclear program185 in return for economic and energy assistance. This would also 
result in improved relations with the US, South Korea, and Japan. In  July. 2007, the IAEA 
confirmed that Yongbyon nuclear facility had been shut down and sealed186. North Korea’s 
willingness to resume to the Six-Party talks so soon after its nuclear test, can bee seen as an 
example that the nuclear weapons program in addition to work as a potential deterrent, may 
have been developed with the purpose of achieving diplomatic bargaining187. Even if the 
NPT was not able to prevent North Korea from leaving the treaty in 2003, the treaty has 
played an important role as a whistleblower by providing sufficient and important 
information and establishing a framework for negotiations to make the DPRK return to the 
NPT.  
 
Latent proliferation refers to a country’s adherence to or, at least for some time, pretension 
of adhering to, its formal obligations under the NPT while at the same time developing the 
capability needed for a nuclear weapons program. Such a country can either withdraw from 
the NPT and build actual weapons on short notice, or simply stay within the NPT while 
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maintaining the latent capability for the rapid realization of nuclear weapons. This was the 
path followed by the DPRK and one that Iran is accused of188. Iran is situated in a high 
conflict zone, in the presence of Pakistan, India, Israel, Russia, and USA. Iran is virtually 
encircled by nuclear-equipped armies, and may feel the need to balance that with its own 
weapons189. For a long period, the U.S., Israel, and other Western countries, have accused 
Iran of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. The controversy over Iran’s pursuit of 
uranium enrichment capability and accused nuclear ambition has been intensified since 
2002. Iranian officials have categorically denied these accusations and claimed that their 
nuclear program is designed for civilian purposes. Iranian officials claim that their country 
is in peaceful and full compliance with the NPT. The Iranians see the efforts to deny them 
an indigenous fuel cycle program as discriminatory, rightfully documented by article IV of 
the NPT. Iran has had hostile relations with the United States since the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic in 1979. Since then, Iran has held an almost paranoid and conspiratorial 
view of America’s role and action in the Middle East. The country has seen almost every 
US initiative as a direct or indirect assault on Iran’s national interests190. After the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, America has established a significant political and 
military presence in the Middle East, creating an incentive for a potential Iranian nuclear 
weapons program191. Since late 2002, the IAEA has been vigorously investigating Iran’s 
nuclear facilities, providing necessary information and transparency. IAEA demanded more 
transparency from Iran in 2006192 after the agency the previous year stated that Iran was not 
in full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. The problem on the other hand, is that 
Iran does not violate Article IV. Moreover there is serious concern that a nuclear-armed Iran 
would lead other states in the Gulf and Middle East to re-examine their nuclear options, 
including possibly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and even Turkey193. And that Iranian 
supported terrorist organizations could get a hold of nuclear weapons. This provides a 
delicate problem for the NPT. It is important to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear 
weapons capability but discrimination against Iran’s uranium enrichment program seriously 
damages the treaty’s integrity and neutrality, suggesting that some states are not allowed 
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similar rights as others. The work of the IAEA inspections is therefore important to make 
sure that Iran doesn’t violate the treaty and to lower uncertainty about its uranium 
enrichment program. The continuation of inspections will most likely make it difficult for 
Iran to conduct a nuclear weapons capability without being detected.  
 
5.2. Disarmament 
When the NPT was established it permitted the five states that had tested their nuclear 
weapons prior to 1968 to keep these weapons for the time being, but obligated them under 
Article VI of the NPT to reduce and fully disarm their nuclear stockpiles. When the NPT 
was written in 1968, there was no time limit attached to fulfilment of obligations and 
achievement of complete disarmament. By 1970, the five nuclear powers had a combined 
nuclear stockpile of 38,100 weapons, with the United States weapons accounting for 68 
percent of the total194. The U.S. and the Soviet Union signed their first bilateral 
disarmament treaty in 1972 while the two superpowers still found themselves in a 
comprehensive nuclear arms race. Soviet and American weapons systems were far from 
symmetrical and during the SALT I years alone the Soviet ICBMs195 rose from around 
1,000 to around 1,500196. The world nuclear stockpile reached its peak in 1986 with the sum 
of 70.000 plus nuclear warheads197. The SALT II agreement was supposed to replace SALT 
I, but never entered into force, and was superseded by the START I treaty in 1991 five 
months before the Soviet Union dissolved. The end of the Cold War created a better 
condition and probability for nuclear disarmament. In contrast to its predecessors, START I 
successfully reached its goals at its implementation deadline on December 5, 2001. Then the 
United States and Russia were able to confirm that they had reduced their nuclear stockpiles 
to a total of 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads each198. In addition, all nuclear weapons from 
the non-Russian republics Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine left on their territories after 
their detachment from the Soviet Union were also returned to Russia. The successful 
denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine is an unparalleled non-proliferation 
and security success story, and one that illustrates the value of international norms against 
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the spread of nuclear weapons199. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to 
the United States that had been given a mandate by the Congress reported its findings on 
July 15, 1998. The commission warned that: Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or 
potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear armoury 
pose a growing threat to the U.S. its deployed forces, friends, and allies. In a speech at the 
Munich Conference on European Security Policy in February 2001, Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld laid out the Bush administration’s rationale for missile defence: “No 
responsible U.S. president can say that his defence policy is calculated and designed to 
leave the American people undefended against known threats. Let there be no doubt; a 
system of defence need not be perfect; but the American people must not be left completely 
defenceless”. On December 13, 2001 President Bush announced that he had given formal 
notice to Russia that the U.S. would withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months200. 
START II was supposed to continue the successful disarmament cooperation that START I 
produced. However, Russia announced its withdrawal from START II due to U.S. refusal to 
ratify the treaty and to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002. Before the 
Russian withdrawal from START II, Putin and Bush had agreed to establish SORT. This 
treaty has been considered as no more than an agreement for short-term disabling of nuclear 
weapons. There are no provisions on the destruction of the nuclear weapons and other 
nuclear materials. Moreover, there are no reciprocal verification or inspection measures 
inherent in the treaty201. Today the United States and Russia still find themselves in 
possession of large quantities of nuclear weapons that clearly surpass the nuclear capability 
of the other states in possession of nuclear weapons. While the U.S. and Russia have 
conducted large reductions to their strategic nuclear weapons arsenals, the US after 2001 
has been researching a new generation of small nuclear weapons: Robust Nuclear Earth 
Penetrators (RNEP)202, that may be used in conventional warfare203. The United States have 
also aggressively perused a missile defence against potential and emerging long-range 
missile threats from “irresponsible regimes”204 These priorities have surfaced on the 
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expense of other important treaties and bilateral agreements like the ABM treaty, and 
START II205 and may contribute to erosion of the NPT.  
 
While the United States and Russia have chosen to reduce their nuclear stockpiles through 
bilateral arms reduction treaties, the tree remaining NWS have done this without any 
extending treaties. Great Britain became a nuclear weapons state in 1952, and according to 
estimates produced by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist the British nuclear arsenal 
peaked in the 1970s at 350 warheads and has mostly declined since. After 1970, Great 
Britain has dismantled approximately 150 nuclear weapons and reduced its nuclear 
stockpile to 200 weapons. However, Great Britain has not conducted any reduction of their 
nuclear stockpile since 2001. France and China conducted their first nuclear weapons tests 
in 1960 and 1964, but did not become member of the NPT before 1992. When France 
signed the NPT, the country was in possession of 540 nuclear weapons. France has since 
reduced its nuclear stockpile by more than 40 percent after the end of the Cold War, until it 
stopped the reductions in 2001. Today, France possesses an arsenal of 350 nuclear weapons. 
China joined NPT as the fourth largest nuclear weapon state with approximately 400 
weapons; China has not released official details about the size or composition of its nuclear 
arsenal, making estimates difficult. According to the “Bulletin of Atomic Scientists”, China 
did not conduct any relevant reduction of their nuclear arsenal until 2005, when they 
reduced their nuclear stockpile with 50 percent from 400 to 200 nuclear weapons. Through 
a series of arms control agreements and unilateral decisions, nuclear weapon states have 
reduced the global nuclear stockpile to its lowest level in 45 years. The “Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists” estimates that the nine nuclear weapon states today possess about 27,000 intact 
nuclear warheads, of which 97 percent are in US and Russian stockpiles. About 12,500 of 
these warheads are considered operational, with the balance in reserve or retired and 
awaiting dismantlement206. From a quantitative perspective, the amount of reduction in the 
nuclear stockpiles of the five NWS in addition to the removal of nuclear weapons from 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine along with the fully disarmament of South Africa, have 
contributed largely towards the goal of Article VI of the NPT. On the other hand, despite 
the success of NWS in reducing nuclear stockpiles, it is hard to convince nations to abandon 
their nuclear weapon arsenals altogether. This remains a formidable task. The task of 
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reaching a world free from nuclear arms will most likely remain difficult until the NWS 
themselves stop seeing nuclear weapons as important to their security and fully renounce 
them for whatever use. Therefore further reduction of their nuclear stockpiles is important 
for the continued success of the NPT when it comes to disarmament. Absolute abolishment 
may be more of a wish than pure realism but this depends on the international political 
situation and the participants. 
 
5.3. Degree of Success 
It is forty years since the nuclear non-proliferation treaty opened for signature in 1968, and 
up to now, 190 states have signed on. This makes it the most widely accepted international 
arms control agreement. The large number of signatory states clearly indicates that the NPT 
has been able to provide a strong norm through an international consensus, that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the risk of nuclear war, and 
therefore must be strongly opposed. The significant number of treaty states may be a viewed 
as a measure of success but it needs to be taken into consideration that the majority of these 
states don’t have the technical or financial capability to produce nuclear weapons because 
nuclear weapons are very difficult to manufacture. Two major obstacles must be overcome. 
Fissile material is required for their explosive cores207, and its nuclear device must be 
designed. This is not an easy task, even though much information on this subject has been 
distributed over the years208. Despite the spread of nuclear technology during the last 
decades, building a nuclear bomb still poses significant scientific and engineering 
challenges. In 2005, around 50 countries could produce nuclear weapons if their 
governments decided to invest the time, money, and the political efforts to do so209. Many 
of these states would probably not use resources to develop nuclear weapons even without 
the existence of the NPT, something that also needs to be taken into consideration. Today, 
ten states have attempted and managed, to produce nuclear weapons throughout the 63 years 
these weapons has existed. Technological barriers reinforced by IAEA, safeguards and 
export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In some instances, these may 
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have foiled a nuclear weapons program altogether as may have been contributing in the case 
of Argentina and Brazil’s decision to shelf their nuclear weapons programs, in addition to 
eschewing a nuclear arms race210. The technological barriers have on the other hand not 
affected some of the most nuclear advanced and dedicated states to refrain from nuclear 
proliferation after 1990. India and Pakistan developed their nuclear weapons as non-
signatory members of the treaty while North Korea became the first state to withdraw from 
the treaty in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. None of the three countries were in 
direct violation of the treaty when they developed their nuclear weapons. While the Treaty 
with strong support from the Six-Party Talks have been able to provide North Korea with an 
incentive to return to the negotiation table, and agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons and 
return to IAEA inspections, India and Pakistan still continue to stay outside. The case of 
India and Pakistan shows the difficulty of the treaty to prevent states that regard nuclear 
weapons as essential to their security and also have the technical and financial capability of 
perusing nuclear weapons, to do so. Despite these limitations of the NPT, the treaty has 
established a non-proliferation norm in the international society and is the major 
international legal obstacle for states seeking nuclear weapons capabilities211. In addition, 
the NPT has been instrumental in creating nuclear transparency and reducing uncertainty 
through the safeguards agreement and IAEA inspections, e.g. with North Korea and Iran. 
The treaty has also worked as a framework and provided incentives for states that have been 
willing to give up their nuclear weapons in return for economical benefits and/or security 
guaranties, e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Egypt have also maintained nuclear free, 
after trying to achieve nuclear weapons during the 1960s, and in return gained economic 
and military aid provided through bilateral agreements with the United States. South Africa 
became the first country to fully dismantle its nuclear weapons, and joined the treaty in 
1991, and in return established a better relationship with the international society and gained 
economical benefits. It is clear that the NPT in addition to its close connection to the UN 
Security Council has been dependent on large economical and military powers to provide 
carrots and sticks, when it comes to preventing proliferation, and the role has not only, 
although to a large degree, been filled by the U.S. For decades, friends and allies of 
America such as Japan, South Korea, Egypt and others - have come to depend on several 
aspects of American policy when making calculations about their own security and debate 
the nuclear question. These aspects include the stability of the American nuclear deterrent 
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and US security guarantees212. Although the strong role of the U.S. in the treaty has created 
positive outcomes, it may also have contributed to negative effects. North Korea may have 
developed their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the U.S. conventional superiority and 
strong presence on the Korean peninsula. The deterrent issue may also have fuelled Iran’s 
decision to pursue uranium enrichment capability. After removal of Saddam Hussein from 
power in Iraq, Iran has likely seen unconventional weapons as a restraint to possible U.S. 
military action-particularly given the large US military presence in the region213. The end of 
the Cold War and the end of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet 
Union provided a better environment for disarmament. The global number of nuclear 
weapons has declined from a peak of approximately 70,000 in 1986 to roughly 26,000 in 
2006, and reduced the global stockpile of nuclear weapons with over fifty percent. The NPT 
has since its establishment constituted the backbone of the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime, and despite setbacks, the overall impact of the NPT has been 
gratifying. Even if its achievements have been hard won, and at times increasingly 
contested214, the treaty has achieved a substantial degree of success during the post-Cold 
War era, meaning that it have achieved an important but still imperfect degree of goal 
achievement.  
 
5.4. NPT and Regime Theory 
I will now return to my second research question:  
How can the degree of success or failure connected to goal achievement be explained 
according to different regime theories?  
I will turn my attention to the three international relations theories and their view on 
international regimes and these will be discussed separately and in the same order as they 
are presented in chapter 2. In each section, before examining the explanatory factor for the 
degree of success or failure connected to goal achievement, a brief presentation of the 
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5.5. Power based  
The power-based perspective of success or failure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty 
according to the theory of hegemonic stability will be explained by the presence of 
hegemonic power in the international society that has an interest to prevent nuclear 
proliferation and its benign and coercive means to do so. 
 
Kenneth Waltz215 has seen the spread of nuclear weapons as a stability factor in the 
international society based on its deterrent effect, and that the likelihood of war decreases as 
deterrent and defensive capabilities increases. Because they do so, the measured spread of 
nuclear weapons is to be welcomed rather than feared216.  The fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, symbolized the weakening power of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
leaving the U.S. as the most preponderant economic and military power in the international 
society217. Waltz218 argument is that the winner of the Cold War and sole remaining great 
power has behaved in the usual manner of unchecked powers. As the world’s most 
influential country, with unequal political, economic, and military assets, the U.S. has been 
best positioned to direct a diplomatic barrier against the rise of new nuclear powers219. For 
the theory of hegemonic stability to explain the success of the NPT, we would assume that 
the hegemonic power the US would be able and wiling to shape and dominate its 
international environment, thereby provide an international regime that leads to collective 
desirable outcomes for all states in the international system.  
 
The United States, for long the most dominant power in the world, has the ability to provide 
a sufficient flow of benefits to small and middle powers to persuade them to comply with 
the NPT. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and Egypt serve as good examples. The direct, 
concerted, and sustained efforts of the U.S. and its willingness to bear the costs of the 
denuclearization in the former Soviet republics, along with Russia, were critical in settling 
the non-nuclear status of the newly independent states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. 
This occurred through a combination of political, legal, financial, and technical 
agreements220. American domination may also bee used as an argument for Egypt’s 
continued non-nuclear weapons situation. Egypt is a strong regional military and 
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economical power but relatively weak compared to the United States. Since a distribution of 
benefits reaped from cooperation, often does not result "automatically", states regularly 
offer side-payments or other concessions to dissipate otherwise disadvantaged partners' 
concerns about relative losses. Side-payments through bilateral relations between Egypt and 
the United States may bee a critical factor in Egypt’s continued renunciation of nuclear 
weapons. Although the relationship does not involve a formal US guarantee to defend 
Egypt, Americas huge stake in maintaining peace between Israel and Egypt provides 
assurance to Egyptian leaders that the contingency that long ago drove Egypt’s interests in 
nuclear weapons a military confrontation with its nuclear-armed neighbour Israel will 
remain very remote221. On the other hand, nuclear weapons strip conventional forces of 
most of their functions, according to Waltz222. This implores that Egypt by developing 
nuclear weapons, might have been able to render U.S. military support unnecessary and 
provide for its own security. The hegemony theory provide a reasonable argument for 
Egypt’s nuclear weapons status and continued membership in the NPT but is contradictory 
to the nuclear deterrent argument put forward by Waltz.  
 
According to Waltz, the strong U.S. military presence in East Asia with the deployment of 
100,000 troops and provision of security guaranties to Japan and South Korea, was intended 
to keep a new balance of power from emerging, and that this weary effort to maintain a 
hegemonic position is the surest way to undermine it223. The strong presence of American 
troops on the Korean peninsula did not manage to prevent North Korea from requiring 
nuclear weapons. North Korea according to Waltz224 like earlier nuclear states wants the 
military capability that nuclear weapons afford because it feels weak, isolated, and 
threatened. On the other hand North Korea have constantly used its nuclear weapons 
program as a diplomatic bargaining position in the Agreed Framework and Six Party Talks, 
to achieve economical benefits in the form of oil, and bilateral agreements with the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea. If a states security from a neorealist perspective is 
incredibly enhanced through nuclear deterrent, why have North Korea agreed to dismantle 
its nuclear weapons production when the U.S. threat is still present? While the deterrent 
argument provides a good argument, in my opinion based on the U.S.-North Korea hostile 
relations, North Koreas nuclear weapons program should also bee seen as a mean to achieve 
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absolute rather than relative gain, in addition as a deterrent effect on the U.S. I base my 
argument on Pyongyang constant willingness to negotiate on their nuclear capability in 
return for diplomatic agreements, as mentioned above. As Cirincione concludes North 
Korea and Iran like other states before them, likely view nuclear weapons as a means to 
defend themselves, as symbols of national pride and accomplishment, or as bargaining chips 
to accomplish other goals225.  
 
According to Waltz as a neighbour of China, India no doubt feels more secure, and can 
behave more reasonably, with a nuclear weapons capability than without it. The thought 
applies as well to Pakistan as India’s neighbour226, a hostile nuclear state with conventional 
superiority. And by badgering them about nuclear weapons while being unwilling to 
guarantee their security, the U.S. damages their relationship with such countries227. This 
clearly indicates that from Waltz’s perspective the US should not provide any effort to halt 
nuclear weapons proliferation in India and Pakistan. While the U.S. did not provide much 
effort to stop the development of nuclear weapons in Pakistan until 1990, based on 
Pakistan’s strategic value in the campaign to oust Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The end 
of the Cold War changed the United States view on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program 
and the U.S. terminated all aid and government-to-government military sales to Pakistan228. 
In 1998 after the nuclear tests, both India and Pakistan became victims of U.S. sanctions229, 
however the sanctions were not imposed for a long period of time, and towards the end of 
his administration, Clinton had already begun lifting sanctions against India. The U.S. 
government believed that sanctions were no longer effective either in deterring proliferation 
in South Asia or in facilitating better relations with India and Pakistan in general230. In 
2001, sanctions against Pakistan were also lifted, again based on their strategic position 
regarding the war in Afghanistan, and the fight against terrorism 231. Waltz232 has further 
argued that if a country feels highly insecure and believe that nuclear weapons will make it 
more secure, America’s policy of opposing the spread of nuclear weapons will not easily 
change this opinion. Any potential chance of bringing the spread of nuclear weapons to a 
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full stop exists only if the United States constantly and strenuously tries to achieve that end. 
To do so carries costs measured in terms of their own interest. Waiving sanctions against 
the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, indicates that the United States have not constantly 
and strenuously tries to achieve that end, and the U.S. foreign policy against the “war on 
terror” has achieved a higher priority than non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.  
 
Rivalry for regional leadership and military suspicions has fuelled the competition between 
Argentina and Brazil in nuclear development since the early 1950s233. According to 
Waltz234, some countries need nuclear weapons and some do not. He also emphasize, as 
mentioned earlier, that Brazil and Argentina set themselves on course to become nuclear 
states but abandoned their efforts, because neither posed a threat to the other. On the other 
hand, if states are more concerned about relative gains than absolute gain, how can 
neorealism provide a rational for the bilateral agreements between Argentina and Brazil? 
Scott D. Sagan235 points out that from a realist perspective that nuclear restraint is caused by 
the absence of the fundamental military threat that produces positive proliferation decisions. 
Each state would prefer to be the only nuclear weapons power in its region. However, that is 
an unlike outcome if it develops a nuclear arsenal. States is willing to refrain from 
proliferation if, and only if, its neighbours remain non-nuclear. T.V Paul236 points out that 
the hegemonic theory is insufficient to explain the non-nuclear acquisition and the U.S. 
played no direct role in the regional nuclear rapprochement. America’s hegemony in the 
western hemisphere was not sufficient to pursue Argentina and Brazil to forgo their nuclear 
weapons program, even if they were both under constant American pressure from the 1970s 
to adhere to Tlatelolco and the NPT237. U.S. pressure indeed pushed Argentina and Brazil to 
maintain their opposition to the NPT. Dissatisfaction with nuclear hegemony rather 
encouraged nationalistic tendencies in these two countries and reinforced their desire for 
autarkic nuclear policies. While U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere was not 
sufficient to persuade Argentina and Brazil to give up their nuclear weapons programs 
during the 1970s and 1980s, it may therefore lack an explanatory factor for the nuclear non-
acquisition choice of Argentina and Brazil.  
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Waltz deterrent argument is a sufficient explanatory factor for South Africa’s nuclear 
development in the 1970s and 1980s when it was a rather isolated country facing a strong 
rival in its neighbouring countries. Waltz points out that when South Africa found no 
commensurate threat, it reversed its policy238. However, Waltz does not provide us with a 
rational for the nuclear weapons rollback that took place during the beginning of the 1990s, 
and South Africa’s decision to give up their nuclear weapons without having a great-power 
protector239. With no other nuclear weapon states in the region, nuclear weapons would 
have been a tremendous security asset. Since 1968, South Africa refused to join the NPT, 
despite that every U.S., administration urged South Africa to formally renounce its nuclear 
ambitions by signing the NPT and placing all its nuclear facilities under international 
safeguards. America more than any country, has applied pressure on South Africa to accede 
to the NPT240. Even if international pressure and sanction may have contributed to South 
Africa’s nuclear rollback after 1990, a change in the security environment and the 
dissolvent of apartheid, need to be assessed as contributory elements.  
 
Since the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, Iran has likely seen 
unconventional weapons as a deterrent to possible U.S. military action-particularly given 
the large U.S. military presence in the region and a way to increase Iran’s power and 
prestige in the Persian Gulf241. After the IAEA decided Iran showed non-compliance with 
its Safeguards Agreement in September 2005, the UN have passed several Security Council 
resolutions requesting Iran to stop its enrichment and reprocessing related work242. Iran has 
continued its work towards uranium enrichment capabilities, regardless of strong 
international pressure headed by the U.S. The deterrent argument may provide us with a 
reasonable explanatory factor for Iran’s behaviour. Should Iran regardless of its own 
statements, develop nuclear weapons, US pressure and incentive to stop a state on the brink 
of nuclear development will (once more) have failed to create an incentive for the state in 
question. On then contrary, the U.S. pressure on Iran may have had a negative effect. As 
Shahram Chubin points out, Iran has seen U.S. pressure and hostility as long-standing and 
not exclusively or principally tied to the nuclear issue. They believe that even if Iran 
adhered to the Additional Protocol and resolve its problems with the IAEA, U.S. pressure 
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would continue243. Joseph Cirincione244 points out in an article from 2006 that the preferred 
strategy of the dominant faction in the American administration would rather seek the 
elimination of the Iranian regime in preference to the elimination of the nuclear capability. 
The American conventional dominance spurs other countries to resort to unconventional 
means according to Waltz245. Therefore, Waltz claims that to understand others’ reactions 
we have to look at America’s behaviour. The country’s dominance, arrogance, and the 
unwillingness to ratify existing treaties (CTBT) made and the intention to renounce treaties 
ratified (ABM treaty), creates a recipe for encouraging other states to go nuclear.  
 
Arms agreements are difficult to reach because their provisions may bear directly on the 
prospects for unchallenged existence or defeat246. It must be asked if a neorealist 
perspective provide a rational for the major reduction in the NWS nuclear stockpiles? In a 
nuclear world, peace is maintained by the presence of deterrent forces, strategic arms 
agreements do not only have military but also economic and political significant. They can 
help improve international relations. If leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union 
/Russia came to accept what Waltz refers to as the minority view247, and at the same time 
recognized that a deterrent force greatly reduces conventional requirements on central 
fronts, then both countries can enjoy security at a lower cost248. The cost of producing and 
maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal since 1940 has been estimated to cost almost $ 6 
trillion249. Arms reduction treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia 
may therefore be explained from the cost of having a large and unnecessary nuclear arsenal 
way beyond the needed for second strike capability that is necessary to maintain a deterrent. 
Hence, by reducing their nuclear weapons as suggested by Waltz, the U.S. and Russia will 
be able to free economical assets, used to maintain their large nuclear arsenal, so they may 
be spent in more efficient ways. I will assume a rational for the arms agreements between 
the United States and the Soviet Union also provides a rational for the arms reduction in 
Great Britain, France and China. These countries have restrained from building a larger than 
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necessary nuclear arsenal, and shown no inclination to engage in a nuclear arms race250, like 
we experienced during the Cold War.  
 
From the evidence provided above, I believe that a power-based view may provide a 
reasonable explanation in some cases. Nevertheless, it does not explain comprehensively 
why the NPT has reached a substantial degree of success after the Cold War, as established 
in section 5.3 of this chapter.  
 
5.6. Interest-Based 
According to the prediction in chapter 2. The success of an international regime is based on 
its capability to deliver quantity and quality of information to the member states, and 
thereby, reducing the uncertainty in the anarchical structured international society. The 
explanatory factor for the degree of success or failure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
treaty according to interest-based theory of regimes, is the quantity and quality of 
information that the regime is capable of producing for its member states 
 
According to neoliberalism, international institutions are formed and maintained by rational 
egotistic actors to solve common problems in the international society composed of an 
anarchical structure. Inversion of the Coase Theorem has demonstrated that at least one of 
three conditions must be met to allow mutual cooperation to occur in the absence of a 
centralised authority. The three conditions are: 1) establish a pattern of legal liability; 2) 
provide relatively symmetrical information; 3) arrange the cost of bargaining so that 
specific agreements can be more easily made. As exemplified with the game theory of 
Prisoners Dilemma, many situations in world politics are characterised by conflicts of 
interests. In such situations, actors have to worry about being deceived and double-crossed. 
Meaning that in the absence of appropriate institutions, some mutually advantageous 
bargains will not be made because of uncertainty251. One of the most important roles of the 
NPT is therefore to make governments’ expectations consistent with one another by 
providing quantity and quality of information and reduce the uncertainty among the 
members of the regime. According to Article III of the treaty: “Each NNWS party to the 
treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and 
concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the statue of the IAEA and the agency’s 
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safeguard system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations 
assumed under the NPT with a view of preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful 
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The inspection provided by the 
IAEA as a neutral organization, may therefore need to contribute to transparency and also 
reduce uncertainty about states nuclear intentions if the neoliberal approach shale have an 
explanatory factor of the degree of goal achievement. 
 
Today, India, Pakistan, and Israel are the only countries in addition to the five recognised 
NWS that are not subject to IAEA inspections, but IAEA has the possibility to inspect 
nuclear facilities in the185 remaining states. This leaves the treaty with the opportunity to 
produce a large quantity of information. The ability to do so rest on and depends on the 
willingness of the parties of the treaty to abide by the rules and allow complete inspections 
of their nuclear facilities. Therefore it also needs to exist some mechanisms for compliance. 
International regimes, in a neoliberal perspective, are decentralised institutions. This means 
that any sanctions for violations of regime principles have to be enacted by the individual 
members. The regime provides procedures and rules through which such sanctions can be 
coordinated252. One need to consider that the information that is required to enter into an 
international regime from this perspective is not merely information about other 
governments’ resources and formal negotiating position. It is also knowledge of their 
internal evaluation of the situation, intentions, the intensity of their preferences, and their 
willingness to adhere to an agreement even in adverse future circumstances253. Until 1991, 
the IAEA monitored only facilities declared by the inspected country and did not attempt to 
reveal undeclared nuclear installations, because it lacked a clear political mandate from its 
members. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, however, it was learned that Iraq had 
secretly developed a network of undeclared nuclear facilities as part of an extensive nuclear 
weapons program. This led the IAEA’s Board of Governors in 1991 to reiterate the IAEA’s 
rights to exercise its previously unused authority to conduct “special inspections” that is, to 
demand access to undeclared sites where it suspects nuclear activities are being 
conducted254. The inability of the IAEA to reveal the clandestine nuclear weapons program 
in Iraq left a large question mark on its ability to provide quality of information. Therefore 
the ability of the agency to provide transparency when it comes to the nuclear weapons 
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programs in North Korea and Iran have been crucial for its credibility to provide quality 
information. Since high-quality information reduces uncertainty, one can expect that there 
will be a demand for international regimes that provide such information255.  
 
After the embarrassment in Iraq, the IAEA received vindication in North Korea, where it 
has performed a remarkable job of nuclear detective work. The agency uncovered 
unmistakable evidence that North Korea had cheated on its safeguards obligations. This 
evidence prompted the request for special inspections, and it was the North’s subsequent 
refusal that provided the legal justification for possible UN Security Council action256. 
North Korea ignored the NPT in pursuit of nuclear weapons but inspections provided by 
IAEA have helped reduce uncertainty about North Korea’s intensions through the regime’s 
reluctance to fully cooperate with the agency and provide sufficient and correct information. 
In both 1993 and 2002, the agency, with help from U.S. intelligence was able to conclude 
that Pyongyang was hiding information about their nuclear program257. The information 
collected through inspections have created the ability to start diplomatic negotiations in 
form of the Agreed Framework in 1994 and Six-Part Talks in 2003 to create an incentive for 
North Korea to recognize the treaty and allow inspections. Through inspections, the IAEA 
has been able to provide information, albeit not of the highest quality. Nevertheless, it has 
contributed to insight into North Korea’s intentions with their nuclear program and establish 
countermeasures to make sure North Korea abides by the rules of the NPT. Based on 
previous interactions, North Korea has shown that they cannot be trusted. Continued 
inspections to make sure that North Korea abide with legal framework of the NPT and its 
obligations according to the Six-Party Talks, will be important to make sure they don’t 
cheat again.  
 
During 2003 IAEA inspectors visited Iran on several occasions. The agency was not 
satisfied with Iran’s cooperation and, on June, 6, 2003, a preliminary report was published 
that concluded that “Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement 
with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that 
material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed258. 
Like North Korea, Iran has been reluctant to fully cooperate with IAEA inspections. Iran 
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has been under constant pressure from the IAEA, the U.S, and the EU 3 (Britain, France, 
and Germany) to fulfil its obligations according to the safeguards agreement and provide 
better transparency to increase the quality of information. Since 2005, the UN have passed 
several Security Council resolutions requesting Iran to stop its enrichment and reprocessing 
related work259, in the hope of making Iran comply with the legal framework of the NPT. 
The lack of cooperation has revealed Iran’s possibility of cheating, comparable to that of 
North Korea. The uncertainty of its intentions has focused attention by the international 
society to be aware of Iran’s future actions. This has led to demand for special inspections 
and continued pressure on Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol. As Sharam Chubin260 
points out, the IAEA has dealt with the Iran case with considerable success. It has 
conducted by one estimate, over 1,600 man/days of inspections. Today much more is 
known about Iran and the international society has made good strides in understanding the 
nature and scope of its nuclear program. The continued work of IAEA inspectors to provide 
information about Iran’s future intentions with their uranium enrichment program may be 
crucial for its further success. Should Iran, despite its own statements, develop nuclear 
weapons without IAEA detecting it, it would seriously damage the agency’s credibility. 
Continual inspections would most likely prevent Iran from doing so without creating 
suspicion. Doubtless, it is important that IAEA continues to be informed about the uranium 
enrichment program in Iran, and that Iran accepts unlimited inspections to provide essential 
information according to the legal framework of the NPT. 
 
From a neoliberal perspective cooperation in the international society enables states to focus 
their concerns on absolute rather then relative gains, meaning that through mutual 
cooperation states can be more concerned about their own welfare and not just that of 
others. In addition to providing information to the members of the treaty in general, IAEA 
inspections have also been used as a bilateral assurance mechanism. As we have seen 
through the 1970s in the case of Brazil and Argentina, the nuclear interaction between these 
countries caused grave international concern. Yet both the regional non-proliferation regime 
and the bilateral mechanisms developed between the two countries lately have revealed a 
capacity to pursue nuclear development while ensuring political stability characterised by 
mutual assurance and confidence building261, hence crating the ability for both states to 
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focus on absolute rather than relative gains. Their example demonstrates how two countries 
have successfully cooperated on controversial, sensitive, and highly political issues, to their 
mutual benefits262.  This provides a good example of neoliberal perspective. However 
Neoliberalism answer to a large extent why states continue to cooperate with the NPT as 
long as it is in their interest, where it lack a thorough explanation is what leads to change in 
states preferences and their decision to join the NPT long after its establishment, to better 
understand why there is a change in states preferences Keohane263 refer to constructivism 
and learning. 
 
South Africa developed its nuclear weapons as a non-signatory state to the NPT.  The 
judicial implication was that IAEA had no right or obligation to apply safeguards to any of 
South Africa’s nuclear facilities. From a neoliberal perspective, it may therefore not bee 
seen as a failure of the regime since IAEA had no responsibility to provide information 
about South Africa’s nuclear activities. Pretoria’s decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons 
program may be explained by a change in the characteristics of the international system 
after 1990, which resulted in a change of behaviour. From an absolute gains perspective, 
South Africa’s decision to increase their economic gain through closer ties with the 
international society may have depended on their decision regarding nuclear weapons. 
When they relinquished these weapons, South Africa re-entered the community of nations 
and began to peruse its true national interests264. Subsequent to South Africa’s decision to 
join the NPT in 1991, it voluntarily gave access to all production records of the Y Plant and 
informed IAEA inspectors that they could “go anywhere, anytime”. South Africa supplied 
detailed documentation on nuclear activity, including imports and exports, dismantling and 
accountancy records, and offered to accept any particular safeguards arrangements deemed 
necessary265. IAEA have conducted approximately 115 inspections in South Africa and 
seems reasonably assured that that the inventory of nuclear plant and materiel declared by 
South Africa is complete. The inspectors have at least not discovered anything that suggests 
otherwise266.  
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Even considering recent enhancements, Egypt’s nuclear research program remains quite 
limited. Its infrastructure has expanded and its nuclear specialists are gaining useful 
experience in areas of relevance to a military program. The relatively small scale of the 
facilities and activities involved and the fact that IAEA safeguards will apply in most cases, 
significantly reduce opportunities to exploit Egypt’s research program to acquire nuclear 
weapons267.  
 
India and Pakistan, like South Africa, developed their nuclear weapons as non-signatory 
members of the NPT. From a neoliberal perspective these countries should not be labelled 
failures in this context. On the contrary, India and Pakistan provide examples of states more 
concerned with relative rather than absolute gain. This results in an inability to reach a 
Pareto-optimal solution. This illustrates that mutual cooperation is not always possible or 
sufficient even if we apply an established pattern of legal liability, provide relatively 
symmetrical information and arrange the costs of bargaining so that specific agreements can 
be more easily made. In some situations, states will always be more concerned about their 
own security rather than welfare. To sum up, the neorealism may provide a better 
explanatory factor for the nuclear weapons development in India and Pakistan than the 
neoliberalism, and states under some circumstances will be more concerned about relative 
than absolute gains. The bilateral arms control agreements between the U.S. and Russia, in 
the form of the START I, START II and SORT treaties, were created to provide mutual 
assurance through bilateral inspections that they were both reducing their respective nuclear 
arsenals. START I was also able to include the former Soviet republics of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and able to provide information about their non-nuclear status 
after 2001. Regimes help states cooperate by reducing transaction costs and particularly 
because through reducing uncertainty in the external environment. From a neoliberal 
perspective, each government is better equipped, with regimes in place, to assume that its 
counterparts will follow predictable and cooperative policies268, based on the information 
they provide.  
 
The bilateral arms control agreement between the two former superpowers does not include 
verification of verification on their adherence to the agreements by a neutral actor. 
Therefore, the international society must rely on the information provided by the United 
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States and Russia, respectively, and that they actually have conducted the reductions they 
claim to have carried out. Great Britain, France, and China have conducted disarmament 
procedures outside any additional agreements to the NPT. Leading the signatory members 
of the NPT to rely on the information provided by Great Britain, France and China that they 
are following the agreements they have made in accordance with Article VI of the treaty. 
According to Keohane, international regimes reduce uncertainty by abating asymmetries of 
information through a process of upgrading the general level of available information269. 
Likewise, one would also expect the parties of the treaty to desire information about Great 
Britain, France and China’s adherence to the agreement, and their external delivery of 
symmetrical information. Keohane claims that egotists may obey rules because the 
consequence of violating them would damage not only a mutually beneficial set of 
arrangements but also the violator’s reputation, and thus his ability to make future 
agreements270. However, Keohane does not provide a rational why Great Britain, France 
and China should be trusted more than others as far as misleading outsiders is concerned.  
 
Consequent to this line of arguments, it is fair to conclude that while the quality and 
quantity of information provided by the IAEA safeguards through NPT, even if sometimes 
imperfect (e.g. North Korea and Iran), may be adequate for some states as well as 
insufficient for others, to join in mutual cooperation. 
 
5.7. Knowledge based 
The explanatory factor for the degree of success or failure of the NPT according to 
constructivism (see chapter 2) and escape the security dilemma, is the ability and 
willingness by states to create a new identity. This is achieved by willingness to follow the 
NPT’s norms, rules, and conduct in a collective interest in a nuclear free international 
society. Resulting in reduced fear among states for a potential nuclear conflict. By changing 
identity, foes can become friends, and the need for nuclear weapons become less 
demanding. 
 
Social identities according to constructivism are a set of meanings that an actor attributes to 
itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object. Social identities and 
interests are always in process during interaction. They may be relatively stable in certain 
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contexts, in which case it can be useful to treat them as given. Therefore the ability to 
overcome collective action problems depends in part on whether actors’ social identities 
generate self-interests or collective interests271.  
 
The motivations of Argentina and Brazil to join efforts in the nuclear field changed over 
time. The nuclear weapons program started in both countries during the 1950s and came to 
a halt during the 1980s. Goals shifted with the appearance of civilian governments in both 
countries, the new leaders were concerned with exerting greater control over the nuclear 
programs that the military had influenced in Argentina’s case, or had partially hijacked, in 
Brazil’s case. The transition from military rule to election of civilian president in both 
countries in the mid-1980s infused the bilateral relationship with renewed momentum272. 
Resulting in a shift of identity, and also a new interest in the bilateral agreements to escape 
a security dilemma, through information and knowledge. The process started by the 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation agreements in the 1980s. It raised expectations 
about the role of confidence building measures and policies aimed at the reduction of 
mutual suspicion. Such measures were seen as setting the basis for an eventual emergency 
of a ”security community” in which both Argentina and Brazil explicitly retreated form the 
nuclear threshold273, through a shared insight of best way forward. The bilateral agreement 
was made possible through an international framework that encouraged commitment to non-
acquisition of nuclear weapons. To use the words of Wendt274, through repeated acts of 
reciprocal cooperation, actors form mutual expectations that enable them to continue 
cooperation. South Africa’s nuclear weapons withdrawal may also bee explained from a 
result of change in identity based on extensive political change of identity. Going from 
minority apartheid rule to democratic government provide, from a constructivist viewpoint, 
an explanation factor for the decision to eradicate nuclear weapons. As de Klerk made clear 
by words and deeds, the South African decision to scrap its nuclear weapons was not taken 
in isolation but was only one, albeit important, element in a complete reversal of national 
and international policies. This included the abolition of apartheid and the replacement of a 
policy of regional destabilization with cooperation and friendship275. This created a symbol 
of South Africa’s commitment to establish a better and improved relationship with the 
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international society and halt nuclear proliferation. While constructivism provides a 
reasonable explanation for Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa’s choices based on shifts in 
identities, the argument would have been stronger if democracies have been less inclined to 
acquire nuclear weapons than totalitarian or military regimes. 
 
Since 1979 Egypt has enjoyed a prolonged period of peace. The government maintains a 
large and strong army but Egypt has not been involved in a large-scale hostile activity since 
the 1973 Yom Kippur war against Israel276. The ratification of NPT by Egypt in 1981 has 
turned Egypt into the forefront for establishing a nuclear free Middle East and providing 
peace and stability to the region. Its continued dedication to NPT has paved the ground for 
prosperity economical and militarily through bilateral agreements with the U.S., and 
identification of itself as a non-proliferation state. On the other hand, analysts have raised 
concerns about whether oppositional groups would uphold existing treaties that the 
government has signed in case there would be a shift in government structure277. In 1999, 
Mohammed Sayyid al-Tantawi, Sheik of al-Azhar and the highest-ranking cleric in Egypt, 
called on Arabs and Muslims ”to acquire nuclear weapons as an answer to Israeli threat”. 
Should Egyptian identity change to a more fundamentalist Islamic regime it might result in 
a turn-around in Egypt’s current long-standing  nuclear policy 278.  
 
India’s development of nuclear weapons, in addition to a deterrent against China, may be 
seen as to reshape its identity and international status as a great power279. A fundamental 
principle of the constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, including 
other actors, based on the meaning that the objective has for them. States act differently 
towards enemies than they do towards friends simply because enemies may be threatening 
and friends are not280. India has continued to identify China as a rival after the Sino-Indian 
Boarder War in 1962. Competitive security systems are sustained according to 
constructivism, by practices that create insecurity and distrust. In this case, transformative 
practices should attempt to teach other states that one’s own state can be trusted and should 
not be viewed as a threat to their security281, which the bilateral agreements between 
Argentina and Brazil provide an example of. Yet, by themselves, such practices cannot 
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transform a competitive security system if they are not reciprocated by alter. Then they will 
expose ego to a “sucker” payoff and quickly wither on the vine282. Had India signed NPT, it 
would have provided a symbolic signal towards China, Pakistan, and the international 
society that they are willing to show conduct according to the nuclear non-proliferation 
norm. At the same time, similar logic applies to Pakistan. Indian membership in the NPT 
“community” would most likely have been easier to establish without China’s nuclear 
arsenal. Efforts to enhance stability and security in South Asia have been complicated by 
many factors. India’s dislike of the discrimination demonstrated by a few declared nuclear 
weapon states that impose nuclear restraints on other countries, has lead India to promote 
only global disarmament measures. It has resisted numerous bilateral and regional arms 
control measures that might jeopardize its own nuclear option283. The inability of NPT to 
include India from a constructivist viewpoint may therefore be seen as a lack of willingness 
from India’s part to escape the security dilemma and continued acting on the practice of 
China and Pakistan as rivals. Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear deterrent has been motivated 
largely by fears of domination by India, whose population, economic and military resources, 
dwarfs its own284. The two neighbours have since their independence in 1947, been tangled 
up in major conflicts and continue to identify each other as rivals. This has been an effective 
restraint on possible cooperation and the establishment of a security community. 
Bureaucratic political thinking as well as domestic issues and dispositions of individual 
decision-makers, explain little in the case of India and Pakistan. These two countries have 
followed more or less the same kind of policies under different right wing or left wing 
governments 285.  
 
According to Wendt286, 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the U.S. than 
five North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States, and 
the North Koreans are not. It implies that amity or enmity is a function of shared 
understanding. The relationship between the U.S. and North Korea has been hostile since 
the end of the Korean War in 1953. The strong presence of U.S. military troops in South 
Korea has most likely strained the relationship between the two. Even if North Korea has 
been a member of NPT since 1992, they have shown little adherents to the nuclear non-
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proliferation norm. The regime has on several occasions refused IAEA inspections and not 
reassured the international society regarding its nuclear intentions. However, the 1994 
Agreed Framework seemed to ease the hostility between the U.S. and North Korea through 
diplomatic agreement. The United States had in 2005 no formal diplomatic relations with 
North Korea. American policy towards the reclusive state has altered since 2001 from one 
of open engagement to outright confrontation, with a transition after the inauguration of the 
Bush administration287. The inability of the U.S. and North Korea to escape the security 
dilemma may be seen as lack of actions as well as rhetoric by both sides. The agreements in 
the Six Party talks, has created a new possibility for North Korea to change its identity by 
showing adherents to the established agreement and dismantle its nuclear weapons, and stop 
its uranium enrichment program, in return for a better relationship with the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea.  
 
The Iranian leadership has never announced a motives or any ambition for building a 
nuclear weapons program; rather, it has denied its existence288. On the other hand Iran’s 
uranium enrichment program may bee seen as an aspiration to again become the region’s 
major power, commensurate with its history, geography, and resources289. While Iran under 
the Shah was as a pro-West ruled country, the establishment of the Islamic republic in 1979 
drastically changed the Iranian identity. Close and amiable relations with the United States 
were exchanged by mutual hostility and suspicion290. After the growing suspicions by the 
outside world against Iran’s uranium enrichment program in 2002, the country has tried to 
persuade the international society that its nuclear program is only intended for peaceful 
purpose in legal accordance with the NPT. Unfortunately, the Iranian government has (like 
North Korea) not fully cooperated with the IAEA and showed mistrust towards the agency 
and the international society. A problem with the Iranian uranium enrichment program has 
been to establish a common understanding shared by others, what a proper conduct is in the 
circumscribed situation. Iran has seen it as its legal right according to NPT to produce 
enriched uranium. Other states have seen it as a potential danger to the international society, 
which may be based on Iran’s identity. This identity has Iran given itself through support of 
terrorism and provocative rhetoric against the state of Israel. The same reason has been cited 
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for the strong international pressure on Iran to give up its uranium enrichment program, 
even if they have legal rights to do so according to the NPT.   
 
The greater the degree of conflict in a system, the more the states will fear each other and 
defend egotistic identities by engaging in relative gains thinking and resisting the factors 
that might eliminate such thinking (according to Wendt). This has clearly blocked full 
participation of NPT in the case of North Korea and Iran, and the missing signatures from 
India and Pakistan. All these nations find themselves in what can be categorised as a region 
with a high degree of conflict. Potential conflicts have created difficulties for the 
establishment of a security community. But as Wendt291 points out, security dilemmas are 
not acts of God: they are effects of practise. This does not mean that once created they can 
necessarily be escaped from. They are, after all, dilemmas.  
 
As previously mentioned, intersubjective systemic structures consist of the shared 
understandings, expectations, and social knowledge embedded in international institutions 
and threat complexes. Thus, these are terms of which states define their identities and 
interests. From a constructivist viewpoint, the Cold War was a structure of shared 
knowledge that governed great power relations for forty years, but once they stopped acting 
on this basis, it was the beginning of a structure downfall292. This explains why the nuclear 
disarmament has been more successful after the Cold War when the rational for the nuclear 
arms race dissolved, and instead established a new and better relationship between America 
and Russia. According to Wendt, when actors become socialised to norms, they form part of 
their identity, which in turn creates a collective interest in norms and ends in themselves. 
The result is internalized self-restraint: actors follow norms, not because of self-interests but 
because it is the right thing to do in their society293. Based on this argument, the 
disarmament that has taken place in Great Britain, France, and China may be explained by 
expectations put on them by the international society to conduct disarmament according to 
Article VI of NPT. Contrary to the global reduction in nuclear stockpiles, the nuclear 
weapons states still possess relatively large quantities of nuclear weapons. Great Britain, 
and others, who are not directly threatened by anyone, still seems to place important values 
                                                 
291 Alexander Wendt. 1995. p 77 
292 Alexander Wendt. 1995. p 74 
293 Alexander Wendt. 2001. p 1025 
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on their nuclear weapons294. Unfortunately, it still looks like the possession of nuclear 
weapons is in the self-interest of the nuclear weapons states and that these weapons still 
maintain an important part of their identity. On the scene of world politics, many decisions 
still seemed to be based on rationality instead of what should be more appropriate according 
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Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis has aimed to examine two questions:  
(1) To what degree has the Non-proliferation Treaty been able to achieved its goals?  
(2) How can the degree of success or failure connected to goal achievement be e 
explained according to different regime theories? 
 
When it comes to the first research question I have come to the conclusion based on the 
empirical material presented that the NPT has achieved a substantial degree of goal 
achievement after the Cold War, meaning that the NPT has achieved an important but still 
imperfect degree of goal achievement Today, 190 states have signed the treaty that has 
become the most widely accepted international arms control agreement. The number of 
nuclear weapons in the world has been cut in half over the past 15 years. The NPT have 
been able to bestow membership on every nation of the world except for Israel, India, and 
Pakistan.  After 1990 South Africa became the firsts country ever to fully dismantle its 
nuclear weapons and became a member of the NPT. This was an excellent example of 
nuclear weapons disarmament, showing that it is possible to perform a nuclear weapons-
rollback. Argentina and Brazil has avoided a nuclear arms race through bilateral 
agreements. Both have joined the NPT and several other non-proliferation agreements. 
Egypt, despite its effort during the 1960s, have deferred the nuclear weapons program, and 
been able to prosper through bilateral agreements with the U.S.  
 
The treaty has received a sufficient but not a high degree of goal achievement meaning an 
important and perfect degree. This view is based on several reasons. The first is the 
development of nuclear weapons in India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Neither of them was a 
signatory state of the treaty and consequently has not violated it. However the mild penalties 
inflicted as a response to the nuclear weapons procurement in India and Pakistan, especially 
from the United States, signals to other states that the consequence of developing nuclear 
weapons does not necessarily has to be severe. The danger is that other states therefore may 
find an opportunity to follow suit. Even though the Six-Party Talks was able to constrain 
North Korea’s ambitions, the process is still going on. It needs to be seen if North Korea 
will continue to keep their side of the bargain. A second reason is the delicate problem of 
the uranium enrichment program in Iran that continues to be a thorn in the side of the NPT. 
Unless it is able to find a solution, it might provoke other states in the region to go nuclear. 
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A third reason is the stagnation in the arms reduction in the five NWS. The five NWS 
nations have since 1990 carried out large reductions of their nuclear stockpiles. Despite 
these fact the NWS still seem to regard nuclear weapons as an important part of their 
security, it must be concluded that little or no progress in arms reduction have taken place 
after 2001. In addition the U.S. aggressive pursuit of a missile defence has come on the 
expense of other important treaties and bilateral agreements like the ABM treaty and 
START II and might contribute to the erosion of the NPT. I would also like to remark that 
where the NPT have proven to be less able to achieve its goals regarding proliferation seems 
to be in states that have at one point seen nuclear weapons as essential to their security, and 
continued to put a high value on their nuclear weapons.  
 
This study has looked at different theories of international regimes based on three theories 
of international relations and how these can explain the degree of goal achievement. 
Regimes consist of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that regulate 
state behaviour in specific issue areas of international relations. Neorealism provides only in 
relatively few cases, reasonable arguments for goal achievement based on the hegemonic 
stability theory and lack an explanatory factor in the majority of cases presented in this 
thesis. Pressure and sanctions imposed by the U.S. has not moved the interest of states in 
the direction of forgoing nuclear weapons or weapons programs. An argument based on the 
sole existence of a hegemonic power, cannot explain why the treaty has been able to reach a 
substantial degree of goal achievement. Therefore, it may seem that the paradigm of 
international regimes have a more independent effect than neorealism gives them credit for.   
 
The theory of deterrence has provided a sound argument concerning states’ decision to 
acquire nuclear weapons based on a security perspective, and ditto explanation why NPT 
has been unable to achieve a high degree of success. However, it lacks a reasonable 
explanation for the decision of states to renounce nuclear weapons when they operate within 
an anarchic structure where their security and well-being ultimately rests on their ability to 
mobilize their own resources against external threats. This argument does not provide a 
rational for why South Africa should be less concerned about possessing nuclear weapons 
than states like France and Great Britain. The deterrent theory, however, has been best 
adapted to explain why the five NWS have been willing to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, 
and why the reduction has stagnated after 2001.  
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From the research conducted it can be assumed, that neoliberalism has provided an 
acceptable explanation for the degree of goal achievement in NPT. Neoliberalism explains 
why mutual cooperation is possible when states have a common interest as long as one of 
the three following conditions are meet: liability, information, and transaction costs. 
Inspections performed by the IAEA even if sometimes not perfect, has contributed to reduce 
uncertainty and allowed states to worry about absolute rather than relative gain. The theory 
of neoliberalism answers to a large extent why states continue to cooperate with the NPT as 
long as it is in their interest. It does not give a thorough explanation about what leads to 
changes in states’ preferences and their decision to join the NPT long after its establishment, 
instead Keohane refers to constructivism and learning.  
 
Constructivism has produced reasonable arguments for the degree of goal achievement and 
has shown that through repeated acts of reciprocal cooperation, states have been able to 
form mutual expectations and continue cooperation. Despite some states (e.g Argentina, 
Brazil and South Africa) have shown that a change in their identity has also led to a change 
in their decision not to pursue nuclear weapons, the argument would have been stronger if it 
had been proven that democracies are less prone to develop or acquire nuclear weapons than 
totalitarian or military regimes. The run of time has sadly shown otherwise. A normative 
argument may explain why some states have decided to abstain from nuclear weapons, and 
why NPT has been able to include a large number of signatory states. However it seems that 
states in certain situations are more likely to behave out of egotistic self-interests rather than 
out of a normative behaviour when it comes to acquire or forgo nuclear weapons. It also 
seems that the establishment of a security community is relatively difficult in regions where 
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